132 Chapter 6Archives noted: “The ‘couriers’ were in fact highly trained military or air
intelligence officers, who followed a detailed program of observation. Ex-
perts on transport communications, order of battle, economics, industry,
and sociology were carefully briefed on what to look for, and were rotated
through the courier system. Normally they relied on well- trained memories,
rather than on notes.”^82
Fi nally, high- profile targets such as Soviet institutions, factories, and
ministries recruited among Soviet dissident groups outside of the Soviet
Union. These dissidents would be sent back to the USSR as double agents.
This was Japan’s approach to infiltration into high- profile targets, as thor-
oughly demonstrated by Kuromiya and Mamoulia.^83 Germany and Poland
used more or less the same techniques.^84 For that reason, Stalin’s fear of re-
verse piedmonts by diaspora groups on Soviet territory was so great that the
Kharbintsy were turned into an artificial nationality targeted for destruc-
tion (initiated by NKVD decree 00485 and other specific decrees targeting
them).^85 However, Koreans without an autonomous oblast likely remained
low- profile targets. Japa nese espionage used their own citizens (including
Koreans from the Japa nese Empire) for low- profile operations. There was
also no Soviet Korean dissident group outside the USSR. As a result, Soviet
Koreans had little chance to be recruited or involved in Japa nese espionage
according to the par ameters of how Japa nese conducted espionage from
1930 to 1945.^86
In April 1933, the issuing of passports to Soviet citizens began in the
RFE. On line 5 of each passport was the individual’s nationality (ethnic-
it y).^87 There w ere three categories for those who would receive passports.
Category 1 would receive their passports first and consisted of urban proletar-
iat in the RFE’s most impor tant factories, plants, and institutions. Category
2 listed Soviet urban workers at vari ous enterprises who would be second in
line to receive passports. Category 3 listed pensioners, invalids, Rus sians
without proper identification, paperwork, or residence permits, and Chinese
and Korean citizens. The report also noted that Krasnoe znamia gave “weak
coverage” on passportization and requested that they redact the article to
cover the issue in greater depth.^88 Initially, an individual could choose his/
her nationality. Later (1938), Soviet citizens in mixed families were required
to pick one nationality from either of their two parents. This change oc-
curred due to a large number of Soviet Poles and Germans trying to pass
themselves off as “Rus sians.”^89 In October 1933, Izvestiia ran a story about
Koreans from Central Asia being sent to the Northern Caucasus again to
form a rice commune there. One hundred and seven Koreans were sent and
given 230 hectares of land.^90 Soon, other groups of Koreans were sent to the
Caucasus to build collective farms. Koreans throughout the USSR saw this