Security Concerns Trumping Korenizatsiia 133as the promotion of their narod as an exemplary and hardworking Soviet
people who would promote collectivization and teach others their rice-
farming techniques.^91
This was their apex during korenizatsiia. The years 1932–1933 brought
about passportization, which increased state control over private life and the
importance of nationality as a marker. Inherent in the quality of being a
diaspora nationality was the connotation that Koreans had contacts, connec-
tions, and relations to peoples and homelands outside of the USSR. Soviet
nationality in the 1930s would increasingly display itself as a double- edged
sword (promotion and, conversely, repression).ARSENEV ’S REVIVAL AND PRAVDA’S “YELLOW PERIL”On January 8, 1934, Arsenev’s “Doklad” was recirculated in the Dalkrai-
kom (bureau) with all members and candidate- members receiving copies of
the report. S. A. Bergavinov who originally commissioned the report (1928)
was no longer the regional secretary of Dalkraikom. He had been replaced
by L. I. Lavrentiev, who was regional secretary from 1933 to 1937. There is
no further information about Lavrentiev or Bergavinov regarding the
“Doklad” or their role in its revival.^92 Arsenev stated that the Chinese and
Koreans were “anthropologically, ethnographically and psychologically”
distinct from other Soviet peoples and that, because of their racial and cul-
tural identities, they would not be loyal.^93 He also wrote: “Our colonization
is a type of weak wedge on the edge of the primordial land of the yellow
peoples. On our borders looms over us one- third of the world’s population,
totaling 600 million of the yellow races.”^94 This statement is essentially an
expression of belief in the “yellow peril,”^95 a view that had strong parallels
with that of Kuropatkin and the threat of 800 million of the yellow race on
the RFE borders. Arsenev did not believe that these differences could be
overcome. He argued, “We don’t have time to turn Korean people into So-
viet citizens and wait until they change their opinions and characteristics.”^96
Therefore, he recommended that all Koreans and Chinese in the Primore be
sent to regions north of the Amur river or to Central Asia.^97
One might ask, “Why was the Arsenev report (“Doklad”) revived in
1934?” No known lit er a ture or archives provide an adequate answer. There-
fore, the following is an introduction to some of the plausible reasons. Since
1931, the Soviet government had tried to sell Japan the CER and to sign a
mutual nonaggression pact.^98 Despite this, both the Soviet Union and Japan
had increased their militarization of the RFE and Manchukuo since 1930.^99
Hitler rose to power in Germany in 1933. This gave additional motivation to
the Soviet Union to conclude the aforementioned sale and pact with Japan.