134 Chapter 6Germany was the greater threat, as Japan had been allies with Rus sia during
the First World War and the Soviet Union during the Sino- Soviet War
(1929).^100 Germany was also an ideological enemy as well (fascism).
Let us now turn to the most significant factors for the revival of the
Arsenev report. One, as Japan solidified its control and militarized Man-
chukuo, there was a very large population of Koreans in Manchuria, ap-
proximately 720,000 in 1934.^101 Some viewed Soviet Koreans in the RFE
not only as potential targets of Japa nese espionage and agents, but as inher-
ently susceptible and malleable to Japa nese influence due to their shared
cultural similarities and histories. This is the first factor for the revival of the
“Dok lad.”
After collectivization began (1929–1930), Poles and Germans were hav-
ing their properties expropriated and then faced deportation. Some NKVD
members told them that “you are not being dekulakized because you are a
kulak, but because you are a Pole.” The popu lar sentiments expressed by the
battling villa gers (including Rus sians) saw the Germans and the Poles sim-
ply as foreign ele ments (nationalities).^102 Germans and Poles were seen as
representing Germany and Poland, both of which were considered anti-
Soviet states in the 1930s; 2.2 million Soviet peasants (Poles and Germans
were overrepresented in these numbers) were deported from 1930 to 1933.^103
Yet, t hese Germans and Poles were from Rus sia or the USSR, and many
had lived there for at least two generations. In August 1933, the Polish Mil-
itary Org a ni za tion (hereafter PMO) was discovered by the NKVD to be
operating in Soviet territory in the Polish National raion of Marchlevsk.^104
From that point on, Polish peasants on Soviet soil and Soviet cadres of Pol-
ish descent faced repression, accusations, and intense scrutiny as potential
members of the PMO.^105 More impor tant, Stalin and the NKVD began
searching feverishly for spies and subversives among all diaspora communi-
ties, social groups, and classes.^106
The Koreans were a community that migrated to the USSR and had a
titular homeland outside the Soviet Union. This marked them as “alien” to
Soviet socialism and was compounded by the fact that the state and its na-
tionalities policies rarely differentiated “cultural similarities” from the much
more distinct character of “po liti cal identities and differences” among the
Chinese, the Japa nese, and the Koreans. Therefore, the second purpose for
the reemergence of the “Doklad” was to remove the so- called foreign na-
tionalities (diaspora) from the border regions.
In 1934, the prevailing beliefs and the established facts were, one, that
Koreans were seen as potential fifth columnists; two, partial deportations of
Koreans to Central Asia had taken place from 1927 to 1931; and three, Ja-
pan and the Soviet Union were increasing their militarization of the RFE/