Security Concerns Trumping Korenizatsiia 143stigmatized as potential traitors to Soviet power because of their supposed
allegiance to a pre- Soviet or non- Soviet national past.^129During the 17th Congress, A. Kim was also congratulated for his work
with the Politotdel, a subdivision of the OGPU/NKVD. Its initial task was
to guard the MTS (Machine- Tractor Stations) where all of the mechanized
agricultural equipment was stored. However, during the Terror, the duties of
the Politotdel expanded to cover the suppression of subversives and antistate
ele ments in the countryside.^130 Kim’s work with the Politotdel was preceded
by massive CP purges of Korean communists in 1933 and 1935–1936. The
stated reasons for the purges were to rid the Korean community of “groupism,”
a group mentality and “factionalism”— that is, factional infighting.^131 It is
likely that all of these moves were carried out towards the end goal of prepa-
ration for total deportation. The CP purges removed higher- positioned
Korean communists first, followed by the Politotdel, which removed young
activists and pos si ble dissenters residing on the collective farms. Dalkrai-
kom’s 1928 Resolution, “The Question of the Resettlement of the Korean
Population,” was the initial edict that targeted young Korean activists whose
genesis was a direct result of korenizatsiia mea sures.^132 It was t hese mea sures
that created the activists and their rallies and impassioned speeches, news-
letters, and writings on socialism, world revolution, equality, women’s
rights, and in de pen dence for Korea. This would suggest that, even during
korenizatsiia, CP control and decision making was given top priority, and
that the Party rarely allowed for direct dissent in opposition to its decisions.
The Soviet state both promoted and repressed national minorities based on
national traits and identities. This policy put the young Korean activist, the
Korean OGPU/NKVD officer, and Soviet cadres like Afanasii Kim on a
collision course. In some cases, one Korean would repress or denounce the
other. Yet all were acting out of loyalty to the state.
In July 1934, according to Izvestia, Kim Zayon was captured along
with twenty- three others as part of an espionage network from Manchuria.
They were to commit acts of wrecking on the railway system in the RFE.
Kim ran into the Japa nese embassy in Moscow and requested protection
from the charges. An NKVD officer, Ushkevich, disputed the matter with
the Japa nese embassy representative, G. Sako. Sako stated that if Kim was
from Manchuria, then he was a Japa nese citizen. However, later, Ushkevich
provided paperwork showing that Kim had migrated to the RFE in 1928
and on September 10, 1929, had become a Soviet citizen. The Japa nese em-
bassy promptly gave Kim up, and he was convicted and shot. Izvestia ran
two articles (July 24th and 28th editions) on Kim Zayon and the spy net-
work from Manchuria in July 1934.^133 The act of Kim’s fleeing to the Japa nese