14 4 Chapter 6Embassy was presented by Pravda as further proof of his guilt and partici-
pation in Japa nese espionage. However, Kim was not alone in registering
with the Japa nese consulate. By October 1, 1936, 978 Koreans residing in
the RFE had registered with the Japa nese Embassy in Vladivostok alone!^134
Many of the 978 sought to register as Japa nese citizens (though they were
Soviet citizens) as a last resort when all other resources and proof of their
loyalty had failed in the face of repression as foreign spies or repression due
to cross- border contacts.^135
In March 1935, the Chinese Eastern Railway was sold to the state of
Manchukuo ( Japan).^136 The sale gave the Japa nese control over the Man-
churian railroad system up to Hunchun on the Manchuria/Soviet border. In
the event of war or for conducting espionage the Japa nese had now gained a
major piece of infrastructure to further their hold on Manchuria and ex-
pand their empire. In November 1935, Khan Chan Gol began working in a
troika visiting CP cells set up on collective farms in rural areas. They were
to perform a checking of CP documents, which in 1935–1936 resulted in a
large CP purge.^137 Of the original twenty- three communist cells in the rural
kolkhozes, only six remained intact after the checking of Party documents
by Khan’s team. Khan and the two Rus sians from Vladivostok found three
“reactionary ele ments” among the twenty- three cells. All three were arrested
and one was executed.^138
The Korean community in the Primore (Primorskii krae) experienced
a large CP purge in 1935–1936.^139 It is likely that much of Khan’s work was
conducted among the Korean kolkhozes and that he was sent specifically
from Birobidzhan in order to put a Korean face on a CP purge. According
to Krasnoe znamia, the Korean CP cells were typically composed of young
CP activists and Komsomoltsy.^140 The cells were also hotbeds of idealism
and radicalism. Anatolii Kuzin stated: “In the course of the Party purges
in 1929 and 1933, [and] the checking and changing of Party documents in
1935–1936, Korean members of the Communist Party DVK were signifi-
cantly reduced. Many were excluded from the Party on po liti cal motives,
by accusation of connection with class alien ele ments, and on suspicion of
espionage.”^141
Unfortunately for Soviet citizens, especially young Korean activists
(e.g., members of the Komsomol, INKORPORE, or DoDD), almost all
Soviet organ izations and institutions were under the surveillance of the po-
liti c al police. The OGPU/NKVD penetrated these groups with ease because
they could always find some information on a person, his background or
family, in order to coerce him to report on others.^142 Some in f or mants proudly
saw themselves as “Soviet agents” rather than moles, because they were told
that their work served to protect the USSR from enemies, spies, diversion-