Introduction 3was a diaspora people whose character and fidelity to the state were contin-
ually subjected to trial by fire because of the inherent weaknesses (and im-
purities) in Soviet socialism and its nationalities policies. In the 1930s, these
policies would promote and repress Soviet Koreans for the same inherent
traits; that is, some cadres would be picked for promotion, while others were
repressed for possessing similar qualities and characteristics. The Soviet ar-
chives and Krasnoe znamia bear out the fact that Afanasii Kim headed vari-
ous campaigns and institutions such as the Politotdel that repressed Soviet
Koreans in large numbers during the Terror. This goes against the standard
reverential treatment of Kim’s life, work, and outstanding leadership.^8
In November 1921, Afanasii Kim served as the translator for a Korean
del e ga tion that met with Vladimir Lenin. Near the end of the meeting,
Lenin asked Kim, “Among Koreans, how many are there that can speak
Rus sian like you [as a native speaker of Rus sian]?” Kim answered, “More
than one thousand.” This was followed by a brief conversation about why there
had not been anything written on how the October Revolution had affected
such comrades as Kim and others like him in the East. Lenin’s final request
was to challenge Kim, “The next time that you come [to Moscow], please
bring such a book.” Afanasii promised that such a book would be written.^9
As a Soviet cadre, Afanasii Kim’s duty was to serve both the CP and
the Korean community. However, his primary identification was as a social-
ist and an “internationalist.” Under his leadership, those ele ments in the
Korean community which were seen as too aggressive or too vigilant were
excised and repressed. In this study, we shall examine several instances of
such occurrence under Afanasii Kim’s direction. One example occurred on
November 19, 1928, when Kim was one of two Koreans who participated in
a Dalkraikom resolution that voted to eliminate the mood of protest engen-
dered by young Korean CP activists. These activists aggressively protested
the removal and resettlement of recent immigrant, landless, and non- citizen
Koreans in the Vladivostok okrug (region). In order to remove the “mood of
protest,” there were likely arrests of the young Korean activists.^10 During
collectivization in 1929, it was claimed that 15 percent of the Korean farmers
were kulaks and should be repressed. Given the fact that the great majority
of Korean peasants were both poor and landless, a more plausible percentage
of Korean kulaks would have been from 1 to 3 percent. However, Kim as
the leader of the Korean community did not protest this, as he understood
that 15 p ercent was likely a quota (plan) derived by cadres who were his su-
periors in Dalkraikom or Moscow.^11 Fi nally, in 1933, Kim became head of
the Politotdel, a section of the OGPU (po liti cal police) that was stationed in
rural collective farms in the Poset raion. Poset was 95 percent Korean.^12 The