Security Concerns Trumping Korenizatsiia 147trict (raion)” along with 182 Korean “village Soviets,” which were the small-
est form of autonomous territory.^156
De facto, the Soviet regime practiced “gerrymandering” when divid-
ing up administrative territories for the Koreans.^157 This denied them a large
autonomous region where the titular nationality typically directed the re-
gion’s CP, Soviet institutions, and police force. In the national construction
of the Koreans of the RFE, this was akin to creating a body without a lead-
ership “head,” the result of which was a Soviet Korean leadership whose
powers and roles were attenuated and restricted only to the small “village
soviets” and lacked the typical vertical chain of command involving a Korean
ASSR secretary and leaders of the oblast, districts (raiony) and fi nally, vil-
lage soviets. A hy po thet i cal Korean ASSR would also have included several
military and naval bases within its jurisdiction. A power ful and charismatic
Korean secretary would have had the potential to coerce many followers in
the CP, military, police, and NKVD in the event of an insurrection. This is
exactly what happened in Bashkiria in 1920 when Ahmed Zeki Validov
turned Bashrevcom against the Bolsheviks.^158
This “deconstruction” of Korean territorial autonomy was intentionally
created, as all of the 182 “village soviets” were more or less contiguous.
Soviet gerrymandering produced an inferior territorial and administrative
structure for the Koreans in comparison with the Uzbek SSR, the Turkmen
SSR, and the Yakut, Tatar, and Karelian ASSRs, all of which possessed the
aforementioned vertical leadership hierarchy.^159 Effectively, it was a socialist
deconstruction of the Koreans that did not represent actual equality with the
other Soviet nationalities, nor did it reflect the economic and po liti cal im-
portance of the Koreans to the RFE. Rather, it demonstrated a deep- seated
fear about Koreans (Poles and Germans as well) that went far beyond what
any socialist “remaking” or educational campaigns could undo. Given that
the Soviet Koreans could not have been juridical Japa nese citizens, I attri-
bute these fears and views of the Koreans to Rus sian and primordialist views
of race, which saw them as alien and closer to the Japa nese due to racial
rather than environmental factors. This belief and the accompanying geopo-
liti c al fears were borne out in the construction of the Soviet- generated Rab-
krin report.
Also, in the mid-1930s, vari ous Korean theater groups were perform-
ing throughout the Primore, visiting vari ous Korean villages, schools, and
kolkhozes. Many Koreans were studying in institutions of higher education
outside of the RFE, and young Koreans were especially delighted if they
were accepted into the most prestigious universities located in Moscow and
Leningrad. Illiteracy campaigns (likbez) continued. In May 1937, medical
care ser vice was being expanded in the Korean community. An outpatient