154 Chapter 7obstacles in the way of Koreans’ leaving the border [of the USSR via Man-
churia or Korea] if they so desire, simply allow them to cross the border.”
Some may won der if this was simply a ploy and those who asked to leave the
Soviet Union were shot. It was not. For example, in the village of Khmelnits-
kaia, 16 kilo meters from Suchan, fifteen Koreans asked to return to Korea
instead of being deported. The deportation of Khmelnitskaia’s villa gers took
place from October 12 to 28, 1937. The fifteen Koreans who wished to leave
were held until November 3, when they were led by the NKVD to the Man-
churian border (in lieu of Korea) and allowed to cross.^15 Innokenti Kim re-
ported that the inhabitants of his village, Krabbe, on the border in Poset
raion between Korea and Rus sia, were given the choice of relinquishing all
their Soviet documents and returning to Korea or facing deportation. Some-
one in the village asked, “If we go to Korea and find that we do not like it,
can we return?” Innokenti stated that the Soviet authorities gave them a
definitive “no,” and with that, every one in his village opted for deportation.^16
On August 24, 1937, Nikolai Ezhov amended Article 5, adding a stipu-
lation that Koreans who were NKVD, Red Army, or had worked in defense or
military enterprises were strictly forbidden to leave Soviet borders in lieu of
deportation. Regardless, Article 5 of the deportation resolution puts a serious
dent in the argument that Koreans were espionage agents for Japan. Allowing
Koreans not named in Ezhov’s addendum (in par tic u lar, former Soviet cadres)
to cross freely would have allowed Japan free access to recuperate and collect
the posited intelligence from any spies they had placed in the RFE. They could
have been recycled by Japan to collect intelligence in Central Asia. Article 5
supports the idea that there were few if any Soviet Koreans working as tools of
Japa nese espionage.^17 However, it is unknown how many Koreans were al-
lowed to cross over to Manchuria and Korea in lieu of internal deportation.
The Korean population in one census in 1927 was found to constitute 173,000
and was projected to grow to 204,600 by 1937.^18 Yet, only 172,000 (approxi-
mately) were deported in 1937–1938. During 1928–1932, it was estimated that
up to 50,000 Koreans left for Manchuria and Korean due to collectivization
and dekulakization.^19 I would estimate the number of Koreans who took ad-
vantage of Article 5 to be from two to fourteen thousand.^20 Article 5 also dif-
ferentiates the Koreans from all other nationalities deportations. No other na-
tionality was given the choice to face deportation or leave the Soviet Union.^21
For example, Germans and Poles were deported from Western Ukraine and
Belorus sia to Eastern Ukraine from 1933 to 1935, and then again to Kazakh-
stan in 1936.^22 In the vari ous operations, neither the Germans nor the Poles
were given the option to leave the USSR in lieu of deportation.
Article 6 allowed the NKVD to take mea sures against the “possibility
of [Korean] excesses”— that is, anti- Soviet acts during their deportation.