4 Chapter 1stated task of the Politotdel was to guard the mechanized MTS (Machine
Tractor Stations) in the rural collectives. But during the Terror, the Politot-
del literally cut out a wide swath of the Soviet Korean peasantry.
Soviet korenizatsiia could often be deadly. The repression of some Ko-
reans while others with similar profiles and abilities were promoted was
prevalent during this period. If Afanasii Kim had not followed his orders,
he would have quickly been replaced. Kim likely felt that he was the best
candidate to lead the RFE Koreans. Therefore he understood that he could
do more good for them by following orders and surviving rather than ques-
tioning the contradictions within Bolshevism. He directed many institutions
and mechanisms of social and civil infrastructure, security, and repression.
Would Kim survive the machinery that he helped put into place during the
Great Terror? This question will be examined and answered in the chapters
that follow. The example of Afanasii Kim’s life is but one facet of the dis-
tinctive case of the Korean Bolsheviks, their assimilation into Soviet culture
and politics, and their later deportation.
THE UNIQUENESS OF THE KOREAN CASEThere are aspects of the case of the Koreans and their deportation that are
not apparent or characteristic of the other Stalinist nationalities deporta-
tions. The Koreans were a migratory, diaspora nationality that was East
Asian yet quite unlike many of the Asian citizens of the Soviet Union such
as Kalmyks, Kazakhs, Chechens, and Nogais. Koreans did not have a recent
nomadic or seminomadic past. They, like the Chinese, had long traditions
of diplomacy and statecraft, lit er a ture, statehood in vari ous forms, interna-
tional relations, and international trade. In many ways, they assimilated and
adapted to Soviet culture much like the Slavic and Eu ro pean nationalities of
the USSR (the Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Poles, Germans, and Bulgarians).
However, Soviet culture had not yet equalized the terms and treatment for
its Asian comrades. Therefore, they remained a Soviet “other,” despite the
promises of legal and “ actual equality” under Bolshevism.^13
During the Great Terror, Koreans were said to be suspicious, unreli-
able, and potential anti- Soviet espionage ele ments. Yet, several (regiments)
of Korean NKVD officers assisted in the deportation and repression of the
Korean community in 1937 on behalf of the Soviet state. None of the other
“nationalities deportations” (except the Chinese) employed large contin-
gents of NKVD officers of the same nationality as the people being de-
ported. Wouldn’t this be proof of at least some level of loyalty to the Soviet
state on the part of Koreans? Most of the Korean NKVD typically carried