166 Chapter 7primordialist rather than socialist and constituted a major weakness in the
actual deployment of Soviet nationalities policies.^86 There was a legitimate
Japa nese threat to the Soviet regime in the RFE. However, the Soviet Ko-
reans had been inextricably linked with Japa nese Empire through Soviet
policies (Geitsman and the NKVD secret vote), media (Pravda), and policy
documents (“Doklad”) since the 1920s. This blinded the regional (Dalkrai-
kom) and state leadership (Stalin) to ignore and discount the successes of
the Koreans towards Sovietization. Instead, they considered these social-
policy successes to be inadequate compared to the sum of the Soviet Kore-
an’s historical, cultural and ethnic ties with the Japa nese.^87 This led to the
“total deportation” of the Koreans in 1937.
Koreans were judged according to a worst- case scenario taking
into account projections made about certain nationalities based on inherent
characteristics. This assessment reflected a carryover of tsarist Rus sian nation-
alist, populist, and primordialist ideas that linked po liti cal loyalty to one’s
nationality, essentially making both inherent qualities during the 1930s in
Figure 14. Soviet propaganda photo, late autumn 1937. Koreans outside of Tashkent, Uz-
bekistan, supposedly happy and safe (among the reeds and swamp) immediately a fter their
deportation. The woman on the right can barely force a smile. Photo courtesy of Emilia Ten
and Kim Pen Khva Museum.