The Korean Deportation and Life in Central Asia 171and Japa nese citizens in the RFE were sent home to Japan.^112 However,
some of the concessions remained and continued to operate. In northern
Sakhalin, some 700 Japa nese workers on the oil and coal concessions re-
mained in northern Sakhalin. In 1939, Japan was allowed to bring an ad-
ditional 480 workers to North Sakhalin. Japa nese and Soviet laborers on
the Sakhalin oil concession worked side by side. Soviet skilled laborers were
to be hired in 50 to 50 ratios, while common laborers were to be hired in 75 to
25 ratios, Soviet to Japa nese.^113 Moreover, it was difficult to bring experi-
enced skilled labor to North Sakhalin. This explains why approximately
2,000 Soviet Koreans remained after the deportation orders.^114 According to
U.S. figures, 1938 produced the greatest number of barrels of petroleum—
859,012 by the North Sakhalin Petroleum Com pany. Soviet figures show
petroleum production increasing through 1940. However, the total num-
ber of Soviet workers actually increased a fter the Korean deportation from
North Sakhalin (completed on October 14, 1937) from 1,287 workers (Octo-
ber 1, 1937) to 1,317 workers (January 1, 1938).^115 The North Sakhalin con-
cessions ran until early 1943, with only 114,971 barrels of petroleum produced
that year.^116
First, the fact that a small number of Japa nese and Soviet Koreans re-
mained in the RFE as laborers on the “concessions” (fisheries, oil, timber,
coal, and others) debunks the idea that Soviet xenophobia (according to
Martin) and the nationalities deportations were “ideological, not ethnic”
and that it originated from “an ideological hatred and suspicion of foreign
cap i tali st governments, not the national hatred of non- Russians.”^117 In fact,
the Soviet Union demonstrated that it understood capitalism very well. Its
vari ous treaties with Japan allowed it to maximize its earnings from the
RFE’s natu ral resources. Further, the arrangement of Japa nese man ag ers
and laborers working side by side with Soviet laborers created fertile ground
for espionage and “reverse piedmonts” involving Soviet fifth columnists.
The Soviet Union’s continued trade with Japan despite having issued a full
deportation order (to prevent the further penetration of Japa nese espionage)
appears to demonstrate that there were perhaps other reasons for the Korean
deportation.^118
Second, there is the case of Khai Ir Ti, an NKVD translator in Cher-
nogorsk, Rus sia, from 1935 to 1941, which covered the period of the Terror.
Chernogorsk, located in central Siberia near Abakan, was outside the zone
of deportation for Koreans (essentially, the entire Rus sian Far East). There
was l ittle, if any, threat of actual Japa nese espionage beyond the borders of
Manchuria, Korea, and the Rus sian Far East. Yet, even after the Korean
deportation had concluded (by early 1938), Koreans in Chernogorsk contin-
ued to be arrested, sentenced, or repressed by the NKVD as “Japa nese spies”