194 Chapter 9with the United States and the Cold War was in full stride. As an example
of the state of relations, Amer i ca had just passed the Communist Control
Act of 1954, which sought to prevent any known communist from running
for publicly elected positions or office. If the Soviet Koreans had been veri-
fied as fifth columnists or had evinced any loyalties towards Japan during
the Terror or the Second World War, these exchanges would not have taken
place using Soviet Koreans. Soviet Koreans also hosted and were sent to
other Soviet bloc and potential client states throughout the Cold War.^33
This research tells the story of the USSR from a very unique and in de-
pen d ent vantage point, one obtained by going into the vari ous Korean com-
munities and collective farms in the former Soviet Union. I have repeatedly
made the case that the USSR was able to grow eco nom ically, secure its bor-
ders, and especially conduct intelligence and counterintelligence using un-
marked operatives with native or near- native fluency in culture and language
because of its rich resources in human diversity— namely, the Soviet diaspora
peoples. I refer to the Soviet Greeks, Germans, Poles, Finns, Chinese, Kore-
ans, Romanians, and others.^34 This view of Soviet history has rarely, if ever,
been espoused by Rus sian/Soviet historians and by exceedingly few Eu ro pean
and North American historians. Rus sian studies has long been noted as a field
in which it was difficult to discuss racism and nativism within Soviet social-
ism and its nationalities policies with the exception of anti- Semitism. The
discussion between Weitz and Hirsch in Slavic Review should be considered
an opening salvo in widening this discussion.^35 The Soviets crafted a definition
of “nationality” which was composed of racial and at first glance, cultural
components. Yet, any trait or cultural practice, which one can inherit and pass
on, essentially, becomes or functions as racial and biological qualities.
Furthermore, after the Second World War, U.S. Military Intelligence
compiled a report that lauded Soviet counterintelligence for completely or
nearly completely preventing Japa nese espionage activities on Soviet soil from
1932 to 1945.^36 This report was compiled from U.S. Army interrogations of
Japa nese intelligence bureau leaders and military attachés. It stated:
Espionage was the source of least value, due to the strict system of counter-
intelligence of the Soviet Union. It was almost entirely impossible to get
spies into the Soviet Far East, and equally difficult to get them out again.
Moreover, many of those who did get back had abnormally complete
information, a sure sign that they were Soviet spies at the start, or that they
had been subverted by the MVD. The Japa nese had successfully bribed
some of the Soviet officials of the military or civilian agencies, up to
1936– l 938, but such persons dis appeared during the purge, and they were