Burnt by the Sun. The Koreans of the Russian Far East - Jon K. Chang

(nextflipdebug5) #1
224 Notes to Pages 109–115


  1. Sabine Breuillard, “General V. A. Kislitsin: From Rus sian Monarchism to the
    Spirit of Bushido,” in “Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space and Identity,” ed. Thomas
    Lahusen, South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 1 (Winter 2000:123).

  2. “Bednota zavershaet pobedu,” Krasnoe znamia, August 21, 1929, no. 190 (2705): 4.

  3. “Upor—na borbu s opportunizmom,” Krasnoe znamia, August  27, 1929, no. 195
    (2710).

  4. See Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye Koreitsy, 112–113, regarding Resolution 9.

  5. Kim’s article “Upor—na borbu s opportunizmom” (August 27, 1929) came out
    within seven days of “Bednota” (August  21, 1929), both of which appeared in Krasnoe
    znamia. Therefore, it is very likely that Kim knew of the 15  percent quota recommended in
    “Bednota.”

  6. The discussion of the second phase of Stalinist mobilization, a composite of
    modernist etatism and tsarist continuities, begins in Chapter 6.


CHAPTER  6 : SECURITY CONCERNS TRUMPING KORENIZATSIIA, 1931 – 1937


  1. Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics
    and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Rus sia,” in A State of Nations: Empire
    and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Mar-
    tin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 111–144; Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, 89–226;
    and Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens and the Soviet State, 1926–1936
    (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Regarding the expansion of the term “po liti-
    cal crime,” the Law of August 7, 1932, allowed any theft of state property to be classified
    as a po liti cal crime. This was followed by further expansion through Stalin’s personally
    drafted Edict of April 7, 1935; see Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin, 112,
    198–203.

  2. In the Poset raion, the bud get for the korenizatsiia campaigns (i.e., cultural con-
    struction) increased from 412,200 to 1,073, 200 rubles from 1931 to 1934; see Vanin, Kore-
    itsy v SSSR, 303.

  3. The goal of korenizatsiia was to produce educated and loyal Soviet citizens. De-
    fending one’s nation was part of this, but it also mirrored the logic and language of the Ter-
    ror, which held that the USSR was besieged on all sides by cap i tal ist- imperialist nations.

  4. Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye koreitsy, 98.

  5. Bugai and Pak, 14 0 let, 234, for Korean population, and J. J. Stephan, Rus sian Far
    East, 310, for total population figures, 1937.

  6. Gelb, “Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation,” 392. Bugai and Pak, 14 0 let, 227, gives
    diff er ent years for 106k (1926) and 170k (1929).

  7. Bugai and Pak, 14 0 let, 234.

  8. Chapter 4 went into greater detail on the vari ous Korean educational institutions
    (see year 1928). Also see ibid., 235, and Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye, 93–94.

  9. Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye koreitsy, 94.

  10. Pak, Koreitsy v Sovetskoi, 216–217, and Kuzin, Dalnevostochnye Koreitsy, 96–98.

  11. Roy, The New Central Asia, 7 7.

  12. Crisp, “Soviet Language Planning, 1917–1953,” 23–24; and Comrie, Languages
    of the Soviet Union, 31–35.

  13. Comrie, Languages, passim, and Ross King, “A Failed Revolution in Korean
    Writing: The Attempt to Latinize Korean in the Soviet Far East, 1929–1935” (unpublished
    paper funded by IREX, 1992), 53.

Free download pdf