14 Chapter 2add them to our [list] of state peasants [foregoing the subject of citizenship
until a later time].”^21 Another report of 1872 to the tsar states that the
governor- general of Eastern Siberia “would maintain strict neutrality in the
event of a rift [in the relations] between Japan and Korea.”^22 Thus Korean
immigration was seen as potentially dangerous because of pos si ble interven-
tion from China or Japan. Third, border authorities were authorized by the
governor- general of Eastern Siberia to move these settlers away from the
border limits. This was in recognition of pos si ble irredentism on the part of
China and/or encroachment by Japan. The mention of cross- border ties and
dangerous geopolitics puts Koreans in the category of a diaspora nationality
from the first de cade of their arrival.^23
The Korean population in 1870 was estimated to be 9,000 by Maksi-
mov and 8,000 by F. F. Bucce.^24 Despite the vari ous incentives and 100 de-
siatina parcels of land, the governor- general had a vexing time attracting
Rus sian settlers, as the first ten years (1860–1870) brought only 3,107 east-
wards to the Ussuri. Some years such as 1860 (45 settlers) and 1865 (95
settlers) w ere particularly unfruitful.^25 How they were to settle and build
communities was anyone’s guess: the state did not allow for funds or monies
for the transport and the building materials necessary to make a “go of life” in
the Far East.^26 However, “Rus sian” settlers did come in the form of Cossacks,
Estonians, Finns, Old Believers, and Molokans, though the vari ous sectar-
ians came and formed closed communities that added very little to the gen-
eral ethos of Far Easterners. The large land grants (100 desiatinas/roughly
270 acres) and the exclusion from military ser vice enabled endogamous
sects to thrive in isolation.^27 On paper, Cossack settlers were preferred,
because they could both farm and serve as military/martial garrisons to pro-
tect the new territories from Chinese irredentism, bandits (Chinese and
Rus sian), and escaped convicts. Yet, experience proved that Cossack settlers
were not a particularly productive farming ele ment despite holding large
tracts of land. They evinced a general disinclination to practice intensive
farming. They came in the first wave(s) of settlers and received land grants in
the Southern Primore’s most fertile valleys. From the beginning, they began
to lease their lands to Chinese and Koreans. In the first state surveys and
expeditions, Chinese and Koreans were embarrassingly found to be more
productive farmers and settlers than Rus sians and Cossacks. “In 1885, in
the Ussuri region, the amount of land per capita cultivated by the Cossacks
and settlers was 0.6 dessiatine and by the Chinese 1.1 dessiatines.” One local
Far Eastern official noted in 1906 that “Koreans work hard and always get
better harvests than Rus sians.”^28
In 1884, Rus sia and Korea began formal diplomatic ties through the
Treaty of Seoul. This document was the first to lay down conditions for