The RFE as a Frontier Melting Pot 19modate themselves to the resources available. At the same time, Chinese
and Koreans’ remittances from the RFE allowed their families in China
and K orea to survive difficult times and develop small- and medium- sized
businesses. Manchuria also took part in this grand experiment.
However, t hese hybrid practices were offset by the vari ous Rus sian
nationalist groups that began to espouse a militant, expansionist national-
ism that viewed industry and economics as fields of battle. One tenet was
that Rus sia would become stronger through gaining greater control of the
empire’s trade, industries, and enterprises— namely, Rus sia and Rus sian in-
dustry for Rus sians. Pan- Slavism found worldwide conspiracies wherever
there was a middleman minority. In Western Rus sia, Jews were configured
as economic scapegoats in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1905).^54 At the
same time, the Rus sians of the RFE were composed of many assimilated
Latvians, Estonians, Jews, Armenians, Old Believers, and Baltic Germans.
In fact Baltic Germans were well represented among tsarist officials and
leaders. Koreans did not have this luxury of blending in and being able to
“pass” for Rus sian.^55 Nevertheless, urban life for Koreans did provide educa-
tion, schools, and employment, which allowed them to blend in, prosper, and
add to the multinational mosaic of the Rus sian Far East.
In 1893, the following quotas were placed on Chinese trade and mer-
chants in the city of Vladivostok: a 5–10 percent tax on Chinese merchants
and their goods, a special committee to control their trade, fines for violations
of city ordinances, deportation for those who violated the laws more than
twice, and no Chinese trade allowed outside of Vladivostok. Restrictions
against Koreans were more subtle and informal. In general, there were both
formal and informal quotas against the quantity of yellow labor in factories,
business, artels, and the like. By the early turn of the century, Khabarovsk,
Blagoveshchensk, Nikolaevsk, and Nikolsk- Ussuriisk had all passed laws
restricting Koreans and Chinese to reside in their own districts, which typi-
cally included both groups.^56
Yellow labor would soon be replaced by a more dangerous term, “yellow
peril.” Japan’s blitzkrieg defeat of China in 1894–1895 brought into vogue
the term “yellow peril” as Japan acquired the prestige of an East Asian nation
that was accorded the re spect of a Western power.^57 It should not be surpris-
ing that this trope came into usage. Chinese, Koreans, and to a lesser extent
the Japa nese, proved their business acumen, mettle, and industriousness
time and again in the RFE vis- à- is Rusv sians and other nationalities.^58 They
had proven that they had power ful hands and minds. Col o nel Putiata of the
Rus sian General Staff believed that this short war would set Japan’s sights
higher, namely at Rus sia and the RFE. He stated (in 1895), “It is natu ral to
expect that later on there will arise the need [for the Japa nese] to find new