The RFE as a Frontier Melting Pot 21laborer dressed from head to toe in Chinese clothes and fabrics all from
China. He stated: “Watch where the Chinese do their shopping. Every-
thing [is bought] in the Chinese shop. This amazing solidarity and mutual
support go in every thread of life for the Chinese.” He went on to state that
each Chinese small store (lavka) was connected and had links to Chinese
traders in the city. These traders in the RFE were subsequently linked to
large trading companies in China.^65 Ukhtomskii believed in the same sort
of mutual solidarity and conspiracy among the Chinese. He stated: “The
strength and advantage of the Chinese merchants over Rus sians is not only
in their ability to be satisfied with very low incomes, but also in their utter
cooperation.... Companies’ owners and their employees live together and
eat from the same plate to reduce the costs of living.” He ended by repeating
that the way the Chinese did business was unfair and harmful to Rus sians.^66
He essentialized the Chinese time and again. He gave another example:
“The Chinese themselves are content with very low salaries; where Rus sians
would need 50–75 rubles a month, Chinese are okay with 5–6 rubles....
Every Chinese lends and borrows money from other Chinese, which allows
the same capital to be used many times and therefore yield more profits.”^67
Both Arsenev and Ukhtomskii tried to develop paradigms to explain
why the Rus sian worker or business was constantly being bested, but their
efforts produced primarily chauvinistic anecdotes. Therefore, to combat
such a monolithic enemy, it was only natu ral that the state should impose
quotas and restriction on the so- called yellow labor. Ukhtomskii and Ar-
senev saw the Chinese as the main predators of Rus sian resources, while the
Koreans were considered secondary. However, the regime of P. F. Unter-
berger, though agreeing with Arsenev and Ukhtomskii about the Chinese
as predators, saw the Koreans as the primary threat, because they brought
their families with them and stayed.
There was very little chance of a conspiratorial “yellow, anti- Russian
economic bloc,” because among the diff er ent points of labor in a system of
distribution, once the profits dried up the cooperation between the vari ous
points (laborers, middlemen, and officials) ended as well. Those who saw a
“yellow conspiracy” would likely have seen “Jewish protocols” too— that is,
Asian and Jewish conspiracies in business and as agents seeking to undermine
Rus sia where and when either of the two nationalities worked along a produc-
tion, retail, or distribution network with their own co- nationals/co- ethnics.
Not surprisingly, by 1900 some Rus sian nationalist writers had begun to
call the prosperous Chinese and Koreans, “yellow yids” (zhyoltye zhidy) and
to view the Chinese as a swarm sent to Rus sia by the Sanhedrin.^68
In 1906, P. F. Unterberger became governor- general of the Priamur
(1906–1910) and enacted further legislation solely against Korean miners