30 Chapter 2case and his holdings by a unan i mous vote despite the fact that neither he
nor his com pany was found to have committed any type of malfeasance.^95
These two cases are clear examples of Rus sians equating nationality with
po liti cal allegiance to the complete exclusion of other markers of identity
such as language, citizenship, public and private rec ord, and even maternal
lineage for the so- called enemy aliens.
While it might be understandable how Baltic Germans became po liti-
cally linked to Germany, to which ( enemy) nation- state did the Jews belong?
The historical economic might of each of these communities, especially the
Jews, played a large part in their se lection as the empire’s “internal ene-
mies.”^96 The Jewish experience during the First World War further supports
this study’s contention that economic competition between minority na-
tionalities and ethnic Rus sians was repeatedly depicted in terms of a zero-
sum “ battle” of national cultures. During the First World War, the Chinese
were treated by Rus sian authorities as pos si ble espionage ele ments/spies for
Germany despite their neutral stance in the war. Nationalist groups such as
Pan- Slavs, Slavophils, and populist groups created the rumors that anti-
Russian plots, conspiracies, and espionage existed in Rus sia’s minority com-
munities. Rus sian officials were given the authority to arrest and deport
those Chinese “suspected of spying.” However, Rus sians used this term
broadly to deport thousands of Chinese during the First World War. The
great majority were simply laborers and not spies but were deported for other
reasons, some of which were economic in nature. The Chinese were also
banned from entering the Rus sian Empire in October 1914. This ban was not
repealed until 1916.^97
The First World War provided a blueprint for how Rus sia’s national
minorities might be treated and viewed during times of extreme crisis, eco-
nomic upheaval, and internal divisions. More impor tant, Rus sia’s actions
during the war produced categories, attitudes, and tropes towards the said
tsarist peoples that survived with greater resiliency than the memory of the
deportations (of the Poles, Germans, and Jews). First, the empire’s losses
during the First World War were blamed on espionage rather than the in-
competence of the tsar, its military leaders, strategy, and internal social di-
visions. Rus sia’s leaders sold the masses a nationalistic line claiming that
Rus sia had been infiltrated and beset by traitors composed primarily of its
national minorities, henceforth rebranded as “internal enemies.” Fuller’s The
Foe Within aptly described the hysteria regarding spies among Rus sian mi-
norities by stating, “ there was also an agreement that Rus sia would not be
able to achieve victory until it had obliterated or neutralized its internal ad-
versaries. During World War I, Rus sian patriots of every tendency became
obsessed with unmasking and destroying the inner foe.... Treason was the