Intervention 35fishing, mining, timber, and others). It also wanted to tighten its hold as an
occupational force (and perhaps more). Thus, the Japa nese invested heavi ly
in railways and the management of rail resources. They ran a Rus sian railways
school/institute in Mukden, China, which taught Rus sian railway proto-
cols.^10 Five wagonloads of these Mukden gradu ates were sent to Chita, Rus-
sia, in late 1918. Japan also printed its own Siberian currency in its spheres
of control. These notes were printed in Rus sian and Japa nese, but tellingly
stated that Siberia was an “Imperial Province of Japan.”^11 After the depar-
ture of the Americans, the Japa nese controlled all the railways from the
Transbaikal to Vladivostok (the Ussuri, Amur, and Transbaikal lines). Not
content with that, they forced the FER government to sign a further treaty
granting them jurisdiction over any stretch of land within 30 kilo meters on
both sides of the railroad.^12
In addition to the railways, Japan had also meticulously built a strong
and well- funded intelligence network. The recruitment of spies from among
non- R ussian nationalities began soon after the Russo- Japanese War.^13 In
Eu r ope, Japa nese intelligence had numerous agents who were well- hidden
and in high positions among the Polish, Finnish, Rus sian, Georgian, Arme-
nian, Latvian, and Estonian diaspora communities. These agents then spread
through the entire Rus sian Empire as well as infiltrating Manchuria and the
RFE. The first spies were sent to Manchuria and the RFE around 1882. They
sent Japa nese Army staff to the RFE region to perfect their language skills.
Afterwards, these men would collect intelligence while working at regular
day jobs. Genyosha and Kokuryukai, two Japa nese nationalist organ izations
(similar to Black Dragon) specialized in finding Korean- and Chinese-
speaking agents who posed as the Asian “everymen” of the region: barber,
tailor, launderer, martial arts instructor, and Buddhist priest. The Japa nese
also used their own military intelligence officers to pose as Chinese and
Korean laborers^14 and maintained anti- Soviet Rus sian factions and Russian-
language schools in Southern Manchuria.^15 Japa nese archival documents
(Army, Navy, and Defense Ministry) show that, in 1919, they attempted to
recruit agents in the RFE in the following cities: Vladivostok, Khabarovsk,
Blagoveshchenk, Nikolaevsk, Chilin, Harbin, Chita, Irkutsk, and Omsk.
They recruited Manchurians, Koreans, and Mongols, but the great majority
turned out to be Soviet double agents/plants.^16
While rumors of RFE Koreans as Japa nese spies persisted, in fact
there were very few Soviet Koreans who would even consider undertaking
such a task. As evidence, five thousand fought the Japa nese as partisans in
makeshift units with poor and below- standard provisions, munitions, weap-
ons, and training. Forty- eight Korean partisan units are documented as
having fought alongside the Red Army or Red partisans.^17 Kim Pen Khva