Intervention 51nationality. However, Lenin’s theories produced an inconsistency in Comin-
tern policy regarding Pan- Asianism and Pan- Islamic revolutionary move-
ments. Lenin and the Comintern advised several faltering states (e.g., China)
to amalgamate vari ous po liti cal factions, class ele ments (clergy, landowners
with peasants, and proletariat), and ideological enemies (Kuomintang and
Communists) in order to ward off imperialist expansion.^81 To some degree,
even Pan- Asian and Pan- Islamic cooperation was approved and allowed
by the Comintern for “at- risk” states outside of the Soviet bloc. Yet, when
Pan- A sian, Pan- Turkic, or Pan- Islamic movements threatened the Soviet
Union or existed within her territory, the same liberation movements were
rejected and their leaders repressed.^82 Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders
viewed Pan- Asianist and Pan- Islamic movements within the Soviet Union
as anti- S oviet po liti cal formations and pos si ble fifth- column “reverse pied-
monts.” This would have serious martial consequences for Soviet national
minorities that sought “national autonomy” who were linked with any foreign
or ga ni za tion, movement, or government.^83
In sum, the Japa nese occupation of the RFE failed to develop social
policies that would earn them the allegiance of the local population. By the
time of the Intervention there was a sizeable cohort of Russified and pro-
Bolshevik Koreans in the RFE’s urban areas. Both urbanized and rural
Koreans united to form, officially, forty- eight Red partisan regiments and
other Red partisans. Yet, many people, including Bolshevik leaders, could
not differentiate between Soviet Koreans and Koreans from Korea, Man-
churia, and Japan. Thus, Soviet Koreans were unfairly labeled by the FER
government as having “served the Japa nese.” This attitude ignored the lessons
from the siege of Nikolaevsk regarding loyalty, Reds, and collaborators.
Several Koreans stood out as Soviet cadres during the Intervention. Unfor-
tunately, it was Lenin himself at the SCCI who raised doubts as to whether
the diaspora nationalities could ever be completely “remade” as Soviets. This
was the beginning of Lenin’s (and l ater Stalin’s) mistrust and suspicions of
the Soviet diaspora peoples whenever the latter maintained or developed
contacts outside of the Soviet world, even if they were attempting to prose-
lytize others to Soviet socialism. This type of relationship closely resembled
the tsarist legacies of domination and colonial tutelage towards the “smaller
nations” in the empire.