66 Chapter 4the feeling of extraterritoriality— that is, that they were being treated like the
natives or preferred titular nationals in every region and republic of the
Soviet Union.
From 1925 to 1928, as Japa nese ships, laborers, businessmen, and joint
ventures re entered the habitat of everyday life in the Primore, the rumors and
even official pronouncements about Koreans as the “forward guard” and
pawns of Japa nese expansion increased. Dalkrai Bureau (Dalkraikom) even
issued an official statement on May 10, 1926, on the expulsion of “foreign
agricultural and land ele ments” (read Chinese and Koreans) in the Vladi-
vostok district. It stated: “In view of the limited extent of free land resources
in the Vladivostok district,... T[t]heir expulsion to their place of origin is
considered acceptable.”^67 An official from the Vladivostok District Land Ad-
ministration made a specific link to Korean immigration and Korean peasants
working Rus sian land to Japa nese expansion in the RFE in 1925: “Besides
this, we hear only too frequently complaints from Japan about its ostensible
overpopulation and the abundance of unoccupied lands in the Soviet Far
East, which the Soviet government cannot populate with Rus sians. If we add
to this information the fact of the recently accelerated settlement of the
Khanka lowlands by Koreans together with an overwhelming interest of Japa-
nese concessionaries in the same area, the picture becomes clear enough.”^68
It is surprising that the above quote made no mention of the 1925
Convention that was the basis for the return of the Japa nese, preferring to
depict the events in the form of Japa nese intrigue, plots, and geopo liti cal
expansion.^69 This commercial treaty was overseen and approved by Moscow;
RFE Koreans were not a part of the decision making. Yet the state dissemi-
nated the trope of Koreans as “agents of Japa nese expansion” immediately
after the 1925 Convention was signed. In creating this trope, the state sought
to find a populist and easily identifiable scapegoat in the event that the 1925
Convention turned into a geopo liti cal disaster.^70
In February 1927, Semyon D. Anosov published “The Necessity of
Deciding the Korean Question” in Krasnoe znamia, which exemplified a
new era of Soviet dialogue, openness, and whistle- blowing (via korenizatsiia).
Anosov stated: “We need to decide on the labor force for the region. Korean
rice growers began the rice growing in our krai, and up to the pres ent time
they are still the most productive rice growers.” He then went on to point
out it was corruption in the Dalkraiispolkom (the executive branch of Dal-
bureau) that was the main culprit for the continual exploitation of Koreans
without land. In his words, “Even Raispolkom [the local executive leader-
ship] doesn’t talk about the [actions of] Rus sian peasants. In the pursuit of
receiving increased bud get allowances, it is creating the condition for Kore-
ans as tenants, exploiting them in their own turn as poor farmers.” Anosov