82 Chapter 5heroes (the princes of Kiev, tsars of Moscow).^9 Even the Rus sian Orthodox
Church and its clergy were granted official Soviet recognition in 1940–1941
as a “peculiar religion” and tolerated because it promoted a scientific “cult
of abstract man.”^10 This formal rehabilitation and reversion to Rus sian cul-
ture and language as a foundation for the Soviet Union gave Rus sians a
sense of primacy and distinction that other nationalities did not receive.^11
Furthermore, although the Soviet Union declared that “Great Power
chauvinism” was an enormous threat and that only it offered “ actual equality,”
it rarely, if ever, prosecuted acts of chauvinism against national minorities.^12
This detracted from the real ity of Soviet equality in daily life. Korenizatsiia
accentuated national/racial differences by assigning and awarding diff er ent
benefits, rations, jobs, promotions, and scholarships based on one’s nation-
ality. This would actually reinforce old tsarist ways of looking at race, nation-
ality, and the categories of “alien” versus “native.” The gulf between the lat-
ter two categories was extremely difficult to bridge for many Soviet Asians
and diaspora nationalities. In point of fact, in the RFE during korenizatsiia,
Koreans, Chinese, Jews, Tatars, and Georgians were designated as “national
minorities” but not natives. This category carried with it the connotations of
the alien “colonizing ele ment,” a tsarist term. Meanwhile, Siberian natives
such as Dazi, Yakuts, Tungus, and Evenki were classified as indigenous
peoples, which was similar to the tsarist categories of inorodtsy and tuzemtsy.^13
Koreans made exceptional pro gress during the first half of korenizatsiia
(1923–1930). Indigenization programs incorporated and promoted them
within Soviet institutions, but often their advances were seen as having been
determined by nationality or by the Soviet authorities to shore up “interna-
tionalism.” Koreans would have to repeatedly prove themselves and their
loyalty to Soviet power. Likewise, Koreans interpreted the vari ous educa-
tional, occupational, economic (production), and Sovietization campaigns
as means to demonstrate their allegiance and character. They also demon-
strated gains throughout korenizatsiia such as in collective farm agricultural/
fishing production, the literacy campaigns, and later, during the 1930s, in
the campaigns to create “assistance brigades” to help OKDVA (Red Army)
units monitor and patrol Soviet borders.
THE UNF ULFILLED PROMISE OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMYLand and its allotment through artels, communes, and kolkhozes allowed
Koreans to work legally through state- recognized channels and become
citizens. Although land distribution for Korean house holds began in ear-
nest in 1926, they never received an autonomous region larger than one
raion (Poset) while they were a majority in four contiguous raions in the