248 conclusion
Iran from the Sunni interpretation of Islam to Shi‘ism, and turned to con-
verted Christians to serve as their core military strength.^7 Yet both dynasties
(Ottoman and Safavid) struggled in later centuries to maintain authority as the
military backbone of the empire (Janissaries or Qizilbash) began to play a role
in making or breaking the sovereign, determining who would come to power
and how long they would stay there. Initially not only king and warrior (ghazi),
but also Sufi sheikh, the shahs of the Safavid dynasty were like their Ottoman
counterparts also considered the “shadow of God” (although with a different
eschatological understanding). They ruled over a predominantly Sunni Muslim
population, yet had as one of their central aims its conversion to Shi‘ism, which
they successfully accomplished.^8 Accordingly, Armenians, foreign Catholics,
Jews, and Sunni Muslims faced episodes of persecution. Jews suffered from
the whims of the shah, who more resembled a western European king, was
infl uenced by less-forgiving Shi‘i law, and was not constrained by the fi rmly
grounded religious autonomy prevalent in the Ottoman Empire. According to
Iranian Jewish accounts, between 1 656 and 1661 , Mehmed IV’s contemporary
Shah Abbas II (reigned 1 642–66) compelled whole communities of Jews to
convert, resorting to violence of a sort never seen in the contemporary Ottoman
Empire.^9 As they compelled Jews to convert to Islam, the Safavids promoted
Armenian traders. This is similar to how Ottoman policies adversely affected
Jews yet benefi ted Orthodox Christians in the same era. It illustrates how rulers
played groups off one another within their society and favored groups that prof-
ited the administration and dynasty. In the late seventeenth century the waxing
economic strength of Armenian traders in the Safavid Empire and Orthodox
Christian merchants in the Ottoman Empire was one of the reasons these two
groups were privileged to carry out important functions in their respective
societies.
In the Safavid Empire, Mehmed IV’s contemporary Shah Abbas II, unlike
his Ottoman rival, used Sufi s to fulfi ll his conversion aims. His chroniclers
refer to him as a “dervish-loving monarch” and patron of Sufi s, despite the
widespread discord among the religious class over the role of Sufi s at court
and the prominence of Sufi sm in the empire. He encouraged conversion of
the general populace to Twelver Shi‘ism in part by means of dervishes sent
to the four corners of the empire who, like Kadızadeli preachers, taught what
was enjoined and what was prohibited. He even paid for the hajj of converts.
At the same time, similar to Hatice Turhan, who had the Valide Sultan Mosque
built in Eminönü, he also demonstrated an understanding of the power of the
imperial gaze, for he constructed a pavilion on the portal of the palace facing
the main square in Isfahan, an elevated position that signaled his presence
whether he presided over ceremonies or not. This stage was “superimposed