a decade of crisis 43social and political foundations of military administration, it caused a rend-
ing of the social contract.
The Ottomans were in part to blame for their own turn away from the norm.
At the end of the sixteenth century, they had begun to use mercenary units
equipped with fi rearms that more often than not acted on their own as armed
bands using handguns.^12 The government used them because it needed a larger
infantry with fi repower to face constant warfare with the Habsburgs and Safa-
vids, and they seemed to be an inexpensive and effective solution to fi nancial
and military problems. In turn, they drew peasants away from agriculture and
into military pursuits, whether legitimate as mercenaries, or illegitimate, ran-
sacking and rebelling, as after demobilization they often kept their weapons
and turned to banditry or became mercenaries for governors and local military
leaders, further hurting the economy as rebels devastated Anatolia, especially
between 1 596 and 1 607 but then throughout the seventeenth century.^13 At the
same time, the Ottoman monetary system collapsed, leading to infl ation and
devaluation and impoverishing the elite military class. Rebels controlled parts
of Anatolia, and even threatened Istanbul. This led to decentralization as mili-
tary commanders and pashas built up independent strength. Because the cen-
tral government could not maintain order in the provinces, provincial people
turned to the upstart military men for self-defense. The government tried to
disarm and disband the mercenaries, but without success. Sipahis were inef-
fective against them. The only solution was to incorporate them into the mili-
tary and to reward rebels, which further undermined elite morale.
The problem, undetected by Mustafa Ali and others in the elite, was that
the political economy of the Eurasian empires had changed.^14 A decline in
military prebends (timars), commercialization, and the growth of large estate
holders led to the development of ever more complex societies and the rise of
provincial notables. Topkapı Palace had formerly been the authority that legiti-
mated power, trained an elite, and sent it out to control the empire. It had cre-
ated the force for maintaining social stability, by keeping people in their correct
social class, and economic stability, by controlling prices through price fi xing
and directing trade, especially the sending of goods to Istanbul. The administra-
tion was supposed to regulate the market while ensuring the fl ow of supply and
keeping the currency sound. Yet it failed. Price controls were central to keeping
goods fl owing at fair prices, yet controlled to prevent shortages, and to uphold-
ing the economy that upheld the power structure and social structure. With free
prices, others benefi ted. Offi cials tried to halt the fl ow of wealth to commoners,to merchants, to foreigners. They wanted the economy to be subsumed to the
political and power structure, capital to be consumed by the upper strata alone,
to hinder the distribution of wealth and power. They understood all too well