THE ARMED CAMP, 174S-56 83lors had made the decision in principle to go to war with Prussia, and
the Austrians feared that the Russians might drag them into hostili-
ties before the French were willing to join in. 'It must indeed be
counted as one of the proudest memories of Prussian history, that the
resources of thirty-six million people were considered inadequate to
overcome a mere four million' (Lehmann, 1894, 29; actually about
4,500,000).
Frederick unwittingly gave the Austrians a helping hand. He
feared that the Anglo-French colonial war would spread to Europe,
and with every reason he suspected the hostile designs of the Rus-
sians. He dreaded the prospect of ending up entirely friendless, and he
therefore turned to the British, with whom he concluded the defen-
sive Treaty of Westminster of 27 January 1756, 'the worst mistake of
hiscareer' (Augstein, 1968,175). He reckoned without the response of
the French, who, despite Frederick's betrayals of 1742 and 1745, had
still considered themselves Prussia's ally. Outraged by Frederick's
action, the French moved closer to the Austrians, and in the First
Treaty of Versailles of 1 May 1756 they cancelled their guarantee of
the Prussian possession of Silesia. Frederick began military prepara-
tions in June, and on 29 August he launched a pre-emptive invasion of
the electorate of Saxony.
Now that hostilities had begun, the Austrians completed their
circle of alliances. On 2 February 1757 Austria and Russia determined
on a plan of military co-operation, and on 1 May the French signed a
Second Treaty of Versailles which made them active members of the
alliance, which was widened to embrace the Swedes and Saxons.
Finally the call of Maria Theresa's consort Francis Stephen, as Emper-
or of Germany, drew many of the states of southern and western
Germany into the war on behalf of the league. By the summer of 1757,
therefcre, Prussia was at war with the greater part of Europe. The
French stood to gain nothing directly from the alliance, but Austria,
Russia, Saxony and Sweden made territorial claims which would
have reduced Prussia to the status of a minor principality of north
Germany, and extinguished for ever the pretensions of the House of
Brandenburg.
The allocation of 'war guilt' is a question which has divided
historians for generations. In 1894 the controversy assumed new life
when Max Lehmann argued that Frederick too had aggressive designs
in the middle 1750s: 'There were accordingly two offensives which
clashed in 1756: that of Maria Theresa, aiming at the recovery of
Silesia, and that of Frederick, who intended to conquer West Prussia
and Saxony' (1894, 85). The complexity of the ensuing debate
threatens to surpass human understanding, for it embraces a range of
conflicts which were fought on theatres extending from the leafy