THE ARMED CAMP, 174S-56 85worded passages of the Testament of 1752. There Frederick had
written:
Our state is still lacking in intrinsic strength. All our provinces
together contain only five million souls [actually less]. Our
militaiy establishment is respectable enough, but it lacks the
number of troops required to resist the enemies who surround us
... Of all the territories of Europe, the ones which are most
suitable for our state to acquire are Saxony, Polish Prussia and
Swedish Pomerania, for all three would serve to round off our
borders.
Frederick wrote that the conquest of Saxony might be facilitated if
Saxony happened to stand in alliance with Maria Theresa at a time
when she or her successors threatened to break with Prussia, for this
would give the Prussians eveiy excuse for marching into the elec-
torate. Frederick was inclined to leave this commission to his heirs, if
only because, in his hypochondriac state, he believed that he did not
have long to live.
Did Frederick really intend to annex Saxony in the Seven Years
War? Was this why the captured Saxon troops at Pima in 1756 were
sworn into the Prussian army as complete regiments, and not incorp-
orated piecemeal into Prussian units as in the Second Silesian War?
Does this explain why Frederick ordered Saxon city fathers to swear
an oath of allegiance to him (PC 9789)? Was it significant that the
Prussian administration of Saxony so closely resembled the style of
rule established in Silesia? There is no conclusive evidence on these
points. However, in defence of Frederick as upholder of the terri-
torial status quo it is worthwhile pointing out that it did not neces-
sarily serve his interests to incorporate Saxony into the Prussian
monlrchy, despite the statement of the Testament of 1752.
In 1756 Frederick was only too glad to find Saxony at once
defenceless and potentially hostile, for then he was at liberty to
ransack the electorate for cash, fodder and manpower; Saxony as a
Prussian province would have had to be treated much more leniently.
Long after the Seven Years War Frederick continued to build his
finances on the assumption that in the event of hostilities Saxony
would be conquered and lie at his disposal. It was therefore some-
thing of an embarrassment when good relations were established
with Saxony in 1778, and Frederick was forced to consider how to put
the finances on a new foundation (Reflexions sur TAdministration
des Finances pour le Gouvernement prussien, 20 October 1784).
Possibly Frederick also regretted that he was now denied any further
opportunity of wreaking his vengeance on things Saxon. He had
written to his brother August Wilhelm before the Seven Years War