107 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63fresh and intact Austrian force made a simultaneous right turn and
was pushed by Browne north to the Elbe behind Lobositz, forming an
impenetrable barrier to the pursuit.
Major Oelsnitz found the king at the village of Bilinka, and
persuaded him only with some difficulty that the Austrians had been
dislodged. Frederick ordered the generals to meet him in Wchinitz,
hard under the Homolka mound. Here they held a kind of council of
war, in which Ferdinand of Brunswick was able to cariy the argument
against the generals who spoke in favour of retreating. The nerves of
the Prussians were still on edge, however, and a single round from an
Austrian heavy cannon was enough to awaken fears of an enemy
counter-attack. This was in fact Browne's signal for the Austrian
army to withdraw from its blocking position behind Lobositz, leaving
the ground to the Prussians.
In the late afternoon the Prussians pitched their tents among the
dead and wounded, and, as happened so often after battles, the
heavens responded with peals of thunder and showered the field with
rain. The Prussians had suffered about 2,900 casualties, which slight-
ly exceeded the enemy losses. The gallant Garde du Corps to whom
Frederick had given his handkerchief was nowhere to be found in the
ranks. 'After an intensive search he was discovered dead on the field.
He had received many cuts and bullet wounds, and his empty pistol
was in his right hand. The king's handkerchief was still wound about
his head' (Anon., 1787-9, X, 19-20).
The immediate tactical victory undoubtedly lay with the Prus-
sians. As Frederick wrote to Moritz of Dessau on 2 October: 'You
might think you know our army, but I assure you that after yester-
day's test you would believe that nothing is beyond its powers' (PC
8146). Admittedly the cavalry had shown that aggressive instincts
al«Jne were of no account unless subject to discipline and control, but
once more the incomparable infantry had carried the day.
As for the management of the affair, Frederick conceded that he
had misread the field in the early morning mists, and run into an
Austrian army when he thought he was chasing a rearguard. After
the repulse of the second cavalry attack he had posted the horse in the
centre of the line of battle, and 'by means of this novel and slightly
unorthodox manoeuvre I was able to outflank the enemy right with
my weak force of infantry, and ultimately take the town of Lobositz,
evicting the enemy and compelling them to retreat' (PC 8146). He did
not mention that the last sentences covered a period when he was
already absent from the field, and incapable of exerting any influence
on the decisive phase of the combat.
It is not at all easy to identify the moral victory. This was the
most disconcerting action in which Frederick had yet been engaged.