140
THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63
his comrades had been put there to observe whether the bridge was
burning properly, and not to kill a general who was making a
connaissance, let alone the sacred person of a king, which must
always be held in reverence' (Crillon, 1791, 166).
Frederick was spared to range up and down the right bank of the
Saale, and he found a suitable crossing point for a bridge of boats
downstream from Weissenfels. The infantry made an unopposed
passage there on the morning of 3 November, while the cavalry
waded across nearby. In the afternoon Frederick and the advance
guard reached Braunsdorf and learnt that the allies had established a
camp near Miicheln. He could make out little of their position in the
falling darkness, though it was evident that the allies were facing
north in the expectation that the Prussians would be advancing from
Halle. An attack against the allied right wing might therefore offer
Frederick a good chance of success. Moritz and Keith had meanwhile
crossed the Saale with the rest of the army at Merseburg, and after
some blundering through the murk the Prussian forces were reunited
at 7 p.m.
Early on the moonlit morning of 4 November Frederick rode
forward with the combined cavalry of his army to the north-east
slopes of the Schortau heights. He left the main force of the troopers
under cover, and proceeded with a party of hussars to the summit,
from where he could see that overnight the enemy had responded to
the Prussian passage of the river by wheeling their camp about to face
east. The allies were well positioned, and reports put their strength at
60,000 men, which was three times the size of his own force. Frederick
called off the advance of his main army, and positioned it behind the
Leiha-Bach, with the right or northern flank extending to Bedra, and
the left to his headquarters at Rossbach. He had postponed, rather
than abandoned, his battle, for he knew that the Reichsarmee in
particular was low on provisions, and that the allies would either
have to come out and attack him, or execute a dangerous retreat
towards the river Unstrut. The French and Germans had been seven
days now without shelter or regular rations, but they were overjoyed
by the apparent failure of nerve on Frederick's part. 'All their comple-
ments of musicians, trumpeters, drummers and fifers now gave
sound, as if they had won some great victory' (Oeuvres, IV, 151).
The first impression of the allied strength had been exaggerated,
ut the combined army amounted to a still impressive 41,000 troops,
°f whom the Germans of the Empire made up about 10,900 men, and
30}FrenCh' recently reinforced from Richelieu's army, constituted
0,200. Frederick had just 21,000 troops under his command, which
1745 m 3t^3 numerical inferiority still more acute than at Soor in