167 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63Manteuffel he swung his division half-right out of the intended axis of
advance. His regiments were somewhat disordered by the passage of
the birches and spruce of the Stein-Busch, and on the far side they
collided with the deep lines of the enemy centre, which had largely
escaped the attentions of the Prussian artillery. The Russians en-
veloped the right wing of the division, and broke through the centre
at the vulnerable point between the battalions of grenadiers and the
East Prussian regiment of Below (11).
Frederick had meanwhile ridden to join Prince Moritz, who had
commandeered Biberstein's cavalry (D 6, D 7, D 8) and recovered a
heavy battery which had fallen into the hands of the Russians. The
British envoy Mitchell encountered the king at this moment. 'I
thought this a sufficient authority for me to wish him joy of the
victory, which I did. He received my compliments civilly, and, as I
rode along with him, whispered to me with great coolness: Mon ami,
les affaires vont bien mal d ma gauche, je vaisy mettre ordre mais ne
mesuivez point!' (Mitchell, 1850, II, 60). Frederick dismounted, and
seized a colour of the Below regiment in an attempt to rally the
fugitives. This gesture was as futile as most of its kind. He could
scarcely be seen through the dust, and his voice was lost in all the din.
The day had the makings of another Kolin, for the intended rapier-
like thrust had degenerated into a wide frontal assault which had cost
Frederick nearly two-thirds of his infantry.
If the happenings on the centre and left were now converted into
something like a victory, it was entirely the doing of the hitherto
unengaged thirty-six squadrons of Seydlitz. For a time Seydlitz held
his cavalry on the far side of the Zabern-Grund, aloof from the
infantry battle to the east. According to one story, first related by
Blanckenburg in 1797, Seydlitz resisted the threatening and repeated
orders from Frederick to intervene without more ado. He sent an
adjutant with the reply: Tell the king that after the battle my head is
at his disposal, but meantime I hope he will permit me to exercise it in
his service!'
After the defeat of Manteuffel and Kanitz it was impossible for
Seydlitz to hold back any longer. He fed his squadrons over the
Zabern-Grund by three crossing points, then pushed them diagonally
up the steep slopes on the far side against the flank of the victorious
infantry and cavalry of the Russian right. The physical obstacles to
this complicated movement were still greater than the ones which
had faced the Prussian cavalry at Soor. It seems that Seydlitz kept
three of the regiments (C 8, H 2, H 3) under his personal command,
and formed them into regimental columns on three-squadron fron-
tages, which crashed into the Russian infantry simultaneously and to
devastating effect (Immich, 1893a, 147-8). 'This whole wing [that is