172 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63However, the fine combinations of the 'Oblique Order', as ap-
plied at Zorndorf, demanded too much of the judgment of the gener-
als, and of the endurance of the infantiy, which went into battle
already exhausted by hard marches, and faced an obstinate enemy on
a day of crushing heat. The East Prussian regiments of Dohna's former
army had wilted under the experience, and now that their homelands
were lost to the enemy their reliability inspired still less trust. Indeed,
the failure of the left wing had not only brought Frederick to the verge
of defeat, but it aroused concern as to the steadfastness of the army in
the face of similar ordeals.
It was with some urgency that Frederick wrote to Prince Heniy:
'From what I saw on the 25th, I must tell you to keep your infantiy
under tight discipline. Mark my words, make them fear the stick! And
take along with your army all the cannon you have time to collect,
regardless of calibre' (PC 10265)During Frederick's march against the Russians, Daun and the Reichs-
armee had heaped up concentrations of no less than 100,000 Aus-
trians and Germans in Saxony, a mass which threatened not only to
engulf Dresden, but to endanger the Brandenburg heartland and
Berlin as well.
On the Saxon theatre the Prussians had only some 45,000 dispos-
able troops, namely the army of Prince Henry on the Elbe, and the
24,000 or so men of the Margrave Carl, who had moved into Lusatia.
Frederick now came south with all possible speed with 15,000 or
16,000 troops detached from the Oder. 'The celerity with which the
marches have been executed almost exceeds credibility. In five times
twenty-four hours the army led by the king of Prussia has marched
twenty [i.e. one hundred English] miles' (Mitchell, 7 September, in
Mitchell, 1850, I, 445).
On 11 September Frederick joined his forces in Saxony, and
entered Dresden under the eyes of the enemy hosts. He could see the
rows of the tents of the Reichsarmee beyond the Elbe to the west, but
he chose to establish his headquarters on the right bank of the river at
Schonfeld, so as to be close at hand to the position of Daun's army
amid the rocks at Stolpen. Frederick and his Austrian rival had in fact
assumed the posture they were to maintain, with some violent
intervals, for the rest of the war. 'The king held the plain, and Daun
stayed in those hills which so frequently served as his refuge in this
conflict' (Warnery, 1788, 278-9). There could be no question of
turning Daun out of his camp by direct assault, and in this broken
terrain the Prussians were too slow on their feet to be able to trap
General Loudon, who was roaming about with an Austrian flying
corps. Frederick therefore planned to put indirect pressure on Daun