191 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63all, Daun was marching north with the 25,000 men of the main
Austrian army. He reached Triebel on 18 August and opened a
dialogue with Saltykov.
On the same day, 18 August, Frederick fell back to a position on
the right bank of the Spree at Fiirstenwalde, and, rejecting all
thoughts of a passive defensive, he steeled himself to fight a last great
battle in the open field in front of Berlin. He suspected that the
outcome would be determined by chance: 'This is the most frightful
crisis in which I have ever been. Now we must conquer or die' (to
Prince Ferdinand of Prussia, 24 August, PC 11368).
For some time Frederick could ascertain little of the doings of the
enemy, but on 28 August there came the reliable and immensely
heartening news that instead of pushing on for Berlin, the Russians,
Haddik and Loudon had turned south in the direction of Lieberose.
The king wrote to Henry announcing 'the miracle of the House of
Brandenburg' (1 September, PC 11393).
Frederick tracked the Russians from a distance, and on 31 August
he positioned himself at Waldow. He thereby covered the routes to
Berlin and Saxony and denied the Russians all access to fertile Lower
Lusatia, from where they could have drawn fodder for their horses.
However, it was no great comfort to him to reflect that the lifespan of
Prussia was now to be estimated in weeks rather than days (PC
11451).
The second stage of the Brandenburg miracle was represented by
the astonishing failure of the allies to join their forces south of Berlin.
In part this was the product of the discord between Daun and
Saltykov, but it was also the consequence of a brilliant strategic
counter-stroke on the part of Prince Henry, who commanded the
40,000 men whom Frederick had left behind in the south-west corner
of Silesia. After receiving news of his brother's disaster, Henry took a
powerful force from Schmottseiffen and advanced initially to Sagan.
Upon reflection he decided that the most effective blow he could deal
the allies would be to get astride Daun's communications through
Lower Lusatia. He accordingly turned up the right bank of the Bober,
and on 12 September he planted himself at Gorlitz, on the principal
Austrian supply line. Daun at once abandoned his intended march on
Berlin.
Saltykov asserted with justice that his army had borne nearly all
the burden of the campaign, and, now that he despaired of all help
from Daun, he left his camp at Lieberose on 15 September and fell
back east to the Oder. Here he hoped to seize some useful strategic
point for the Russians before the end of the year.
Detachments had reduced Frederick's army to 24,000 men or less,
but by a sequence of forced marches Frederick anticipated the greatly