212 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63weight falling on the rear of the eastern wing of the Austrian army,
which, he assumed, extended all the way to the bluffs adjoining
Torgau.
Frederick set his column in motion at about 6.30 a.m. on 3
November, a day of almost symbolic gloom. He had a route of some
twelve miles to follow, which on this ground was the equivalent of
about six hours of marching. At Weidenhain (Mockrehna or Wil-
denhain, according to some accounts) the royal column clashed with
the Austrian light corps of Ried a little before noon. The sound of the
cannon fire carried to the ears of Daun, and shortly afterwards the
Croats and the Austrian fugitives brought him news that strong
Prussian columns were moving through the woods against his rear.
Daun, collected and efficient as always, began to form a new line
facing north.
A chapter of accidents and miscalculations rendered it imposs-
ible for Frederick to bring his army simultaneously onto the field.
First of all the senior forester of Weidenhain misdirected the king's
column along the path towards Elsnig, instead of by way of Neiden as
the Disposition had laid down. The second column therefore found
the king's column blocking its way, and Hiilsen had to re-route the
tail of his column down an unauthorised track, recall the head and
send it along behind. Holstein's force was the slowest of all. The
prince tarried overlong at his breakfast, or so it is alleged. His
squadrons then made an extremely slow passage of the street and
stream at Schona, and the further march was prosecuted along
narrow tracks of soft sand.
Towards 1 p.m. the head of Frederick's column reached the edge
of the woods north-west of Neiden. The Austrian light troops aban-
doned the crossings of the little Strie-Bach, and Frederick rode out
with an escort of the Zieten Hussars to take stock of the Austrian
position. He was forced to make some radical reappraisals by what he
saw and heard. Not only had Daun, contrary to expectations, found
the time to rearrange his troops into a kind of hollow square, of which
one side challenged the intended Prussian attack, but the east wing of
the main Austrian army reached not to the vineyards near Torgau,
but only as far as the area of the plateau north-west of Zinna. Here the
Austrians had a heavy concentration of artillery, which probably
deterred Frederick from any thought of turning that flank.
Instead of attacking with his left and 'refusing' his right,
Frederick was compelled to shift the whole weight of the first attack
further to the right or west, and assail the plateau on the sector to the
north of Siiptitz. Some of the Prussian battalions had already wheeled
into line along the frontage originally assigned for the attack, and
these troops now had to make a right turn and march in column to the