219 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63Frederick had to be content with leaving Dresden in the hands of
the Austrians, and he distributed his troops in winter quarters across
central Saxony and southern Silesia: 'This is all the advantage we
have derived from that dangerous and bloody battle. I suspected what
was going to happen, and I am very sorry to have been proved
right' (PC 12511).
Frederick spent the winter of 1760-61 in Leipzig, rebuilding the
strength of his person and his state for the continuing war. For the
sake of quiet recreation he sent to Berlin for his orchestra and for his
friend, the Marquis d'Argens. His companions found the king melan-
choly and withdrawn, and looking much older than his forty-nine
years.
All hopes of peace came to nothing. The Austrians continued the
war with a dull persistence, and the Due de Choiseul breathed fresh
life into the French, after all their recent reverses. The Russians had a
new commander, Aleksandr Borisovich Buturlin, and they had by
now completely familiarised themselves with the conditions of West-
ern warfare.
For the next campaign the Austrians planned to maintain 60,000
troops in Saxony under Daun, and to reinforce Loudon in Silesia to no
less than 72,000 men, who were to undertake offensive operations in
concert with the main Russian army. Frederick rightly prophesied
that Silesia would be the most active theatre of operations, and here
he intended to concentrate his best and most complete regiments,
comprising about 55,000 men. Henry was to take charge of the 28,000
poorish troops remaining in Saxony. Another 14,000 were posted in
Pomerania, where the most important task was to hold the port of
Colberg against the Russians.
In the third week of March 1761 Frederick began to assemble the
Prussian forces in the camp of Meissen, and on 4 May he set out with
the royal army to join the corps of Lieutenant-General von der Goltz
in Silesia. It is not at all certain what kind of a war he intended to
fight. In the spring he rated his chances of victory in battle at no more
than even (PC 12822), and on 24 May he wrote to Henry that he
would attack the Austrian fortified camps only in the case of absolute
necessity (PC 12904). Henry nevertheless feared that his brother still
hankered after bloody Batailliren, and he tried to persuade the king
that the soundest strategy would be to maintain equal numbers on all
sides, and hold off the enemy by expedients. This challenge stirred
something of the old Frederick of 1757. It was wrong, he rejoined, to
allow yourself to be pushed tamely back. Rather you should concen-
trate your forces, move fast, and gain the precious commodity of time
by fighting (27 June, PC 12995).