221 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63been to hold the allies apart, and for the first time in this war the
Austrians and Russians had succeeded in uniting their principal
armies. The combined allied force amounted to about 130,000 troops,
of which Loudon's Austrians constituted some 72,000 men, and the
Russians 47,000 regulars.
Amid this sea of enemies, Frederick constructed a secure refuge for his
little army of 55,000 men. This was the entrenched camp of Bunzel-
witz, which extended to the north-west of the fortress and depot of
Schweidnitz: 'Frederick, by judiciously protecting the final issue,
effected his extrication. Instead of acting offensively and committing
all to hazard, as he had done more than once in the preceding
campaigns, he seems to have exchanged qualities with his antagon-
ist, and to have adopted the phlegm as well as the caution of Daun'
(Wraxall, 1806, I, 204).
Work on the Bunzelwitz camp began on 20 August, and for this
purpose the army was divided into two shifts, which took it in to
labour around the clock. Fortunately the soil was a light, greyish-
brown substance, and within three days the position was in a defens-
ible state. The perimeter was about 15,000 paces in extent, and
described the shape of an irregular oblong:
In this location the Prussian army stood on a series of low and
mostly gentle eminences, which were utilised in a masterly
fashion. The approaches were by no means physically
insurmountable, but what rendered them difficult to reach
were the little streams, the swampy meadows, and the
enfilading and grazing fire from the batteries on every side.
(Tielke, 1776-86, III, 84)The line was discontinuous, by deliberate intent. Frederick had about
460 guns at his disposal thanks to the pieces he borrowed from
Schweidnitz, and he mounted the heavier calibres in well-sited
batteries. 'Each of these works was protected by a couple of fougasses,
or by ditches which were dug just outside and filled with gunpowder,
shot and shells, ready to be touched off at any moment by means of
powder trains running through tubes' (Archenholtz, 1840, II, 170).
Outlying villages and commanding sites were also palisaded and
entrenched. Between the various strongpoints, however, wide gaps
were left to permit the defenders to sally forth in counter-attacks,
'which is the essential - though often misunderstood -secret of the art
of field fortification' (Tielke, 1776-86, II, 84).
It will perhaps be of interest to make a brief anti-clockwise tour
of the position (see Map 26, p. 376). Frederick was forced to conform
in general terms with the lie of the land, which dictated that the