224 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63
a joint attack that was to take place on 1 September. On the north-
eastern or 'Peterwitz' sector Berg's corps of Cossacks and Russian
hussars were to skirmish in the area of Saarau, while Chernyshev
(12,000-13,000 troops) and the Austrian corps of Brentano (6,000)
crossed the Striegauer-Wasser and advanced through Puschkau as if
to attack Tschechen. Meanwhile the main Russian army was to
deploy on an impressively wide frontage between Stanowitz and
Zirlau, so as to fix the attention of the Prussians who were on the
south-western sector.
The genuine attack was to be the work of the Austrians, and for
his target Loudon selected the point of the southern salient. The
assault was timed for 3.30 a.m. (the sun rose at 5.16 a.m.), and was to
be led by an advance guard of two columns, namely:
(a) a left-hand column of 6,000 under Major-General Amadei, sup-
ported by Lieutenant-General Ellrichshausen with a reserve of
10,000, and
(b) a right-hand column of 7,000 under Major-General Brincken.
The chosen sector was undoubtedly the weakest of the position, and
the Austrians, once established on the Farben-Hohe, could have
begun to roll up the south-western and south-eastern fronts of the
perimeter, exploiting to the full the lack of any Prussian infantry
reserve, and the fact that the Prussian heavy guns, now facing the
wrong way, could have been extricated from the batteries only with
some difficulty. Much would have depended on the completeness of
the surprise at Wickendorf and Jauernick, and the extent to which
the Prussian cavalry allowed itself to be bemused by Berg, Cherny-
shev and Brentano. Platen, the cavalry commander, was a man of
great enterprise, who would probably have intervened against the
Austrians without waiting for orders, but we must not discount the
influence of Major-General Ramin, a steady but literal-minded offi-
cer, who had the immediate command of the 'Peterwitz' sector, and
who might well have been influenced by the allied demonstrations.
All of this remains a matter of speculation. The allied army was
at a high pitch of excitement on the night of 31 August, awaiting the
order to attack, when Buturlin suddenly gave way to the pressure of
his generals and withdrew his consent to the enterprise. Frederick
still expected an attack from one day to the next. At last, on 9
September, Buturlin decamped, pleading lack of provisions. To en-
courage him on his way, Frederick sent Platen with a corps of 10,000
troops on a raid against the Russian base areas in western Poland.
Buturlin retreated beyond the far side of the Oder on 14 Septem-
ber, but he had assigned one-third of his infantry to Austrian com-
mand, which left Loudon with a respectable force of 80,000 or more