227 THE SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-63just consider - to die bit by bit or to die all together, don't they
amount to the same thing?' (9 January, PC 13390).
It was a different Frederick, more realistic, more concerned to
secure some kind of existence for Prussia over the long term, who had
meanwhile been in correspondence with his foreign minister Finc-
kenstein. He outlined to him the advance of the allies in Silesia,
Saxony and Pomerania, and frankly owned how much the con-
tinuance of the struggle depended on Turkish help: 'Quite simply, we
are lost without their assistance' (10 December, PC 13332). This, he
admitted on 6 Januaiy 1762, was not something which could be relied
on:
If such aid is not forthcoming, our courage and our armed forces
will be unequal to sustaining the next campaign, let alone
restoring our affairs. It seems to me that we ought to open
negotiations, so as to rescue all we can from the wreckage of my
cause, and preserve the interests of my nephew from the greed of
my enemies. I leave it to your judgment to decide whether to
embark on these negotiations through the English, or whether
the situation is so urgent that you must address yourself directly
to France, Vienna or St Petersburg. (PC 13383)
Frederick's spirit was overcome, at the close of 1761, not just by the
strategic implications of the loss of Schweidnitz and Colberg, but by
processes that were ravaging the structures of army and state.
Interestingly enough, Frederick's good management spared Prus-
sia from financial crises of the kind which caused a slackening of the
Austrian military effort in 1761 and set France oh the path to
revolution. Frederick's achievement was all the greater when we
reflect that he embarked on the conflict with a treasury of a little over
13,500,000 thaler at his disposal, that the war cost a total of
140,000,000 Oohnson, 1975, 184), and that he had nevertheless con-
trived to amass a surplus of 14,500,000 by the end.
How had he done it? Only a small proportion of these sums
derived from conventional sources like the produce of the royal
domains, or the taxes and loans raised from the provinces. However,
the British subsidy, made over at £670,000 per annum, yielded the
equivalent of27,500,000 thaler between the first payment in July 1758
and the termination in 1761. No less than 48,000,000 more were raised
by force in Saxony, and further contributions in money and kind were
exacted from the neighbouring German states: 'An important note
concerning the Mecklenburg contributions! Take some hostages, and
threaten the stewards of the duke that you will start burning and
plundering unless they pay up promptly' (to Dohna, 4 December
1758, PC 10582).