277 THE WAR OF THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION, 1778-9cite not only the strategy for the opening campaign, but the Instruc-
tion to Brunswick on 16 January 1779, and the further set of Reflex-
ions of 28 September of the same year, which again made the Danube
the objective in the event of peace breaking down (Oeuvres, XXIX,
132-44). All the restraints were on the Austrian side, as when
Thugut's negotiations prevented Joseph from falling on the Prussians
as they shuffled from Welsdorf to Burkersdorf.
The reasons for the Prussian failure must therefore be of a
military character. It was only too evident that every branch of
Frederick's army was in a state of decline. If the demoralisation
among the infantry was regrettable, the indiscipline of the cavalry
was a matter of still greater concern, for the native troopers had
always been counted as the most reliable element in the service.
Much had also been expected of the artillery, and yet 'at the time of
the invasion of Bohemia, the artillery train was already reduced to
the kind of condition you would normally have seen only by the end
of a campaign' (Kaltenborn, 1790-1, II, 137). The officials of the
commissariat proved to be every bit as rapacious as Frederick feared
they were going to be, but the extent of the collapse of the medical
services remained unknown to him until Dr J.G. Zimmermann told
him about it in 1786 (Zimmermann, 1788, 125). The army as a whole
was unresponsive and painfully slow-moving, and it needed three or
four days to recover from a single march.
Frederick bears the ultimate responsibility for the shortcomings
in 1778, in the same way as he has the credit for the brilliant
campaigns of 1745 and late 1757. Observers returned to Berlin to
report that
His Majesty has experienced a great diminution of that
confidence in his abilities, and enthusiasm for his person, which
inspired the troops at their onset. That his age and infirmities
make him unable to transport himself with his usual expedition
to the different scenes of action, where he wishes to preside, and
opportunities are thus lost which might be improved into
decisive advantages. (H. Elliot, 1 December 1778, PROSP90/
107)This is confirmed by the evidence of Friedrich Wilhelm von Schmet-
tau, who was in the immediate proximity of the king for most of the
campaign. Schmettau was certain that Frederick was serious about
his war, and he finds the reasons for the disappointing outcome in the
mental as well as the physical failings of the king, who concentrated
in himself an authority which he was no longer capable of wielding
(Schmettau, 1789, 1-2, 5).