305 FREDERICK AND WARthat was first evident in 1758, and which became more pronounced in
the final decades of the reign:
A general will be mistaken if he rushes to attack the enemy in
hilltop positions. The force of circumstances sometimes
compelled me to resort to this extremity, but in a war waged
between equal forces you can be more certain of gaining the
advantage by the employment of deception and speed, while
exposing yourself to fewer risks. (Preface, 3 March 1764, to
'Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans', Oeuvres, IV; see also
'Reflexions', 1758, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 163; 'Castram6trie', 1770,
Oeuvres, XXIX, 5; 'Reflexions sur les Projets de Campagne',
1775, Oeuvres, XXIX, 83, 91-2; 'Political Testament', 1768, in
Frederick, 1920, 163, 173; PC 12904; Lossow, 1826, 11; Kalkreuth,
1840, II, 150)Utterly irreconcilable with the viewpoint of some of the histor-
ians of the German General Staff was the idea that Frederick could
ever have made the possession of territory his objective, rather than
the violent overthrow of the enemy main force (Gr. Gstb., 1890-3, III,
327). In fact, considerations of territorial control were often para-
mount in the thinking of Frederick and his opponents, for they related
directly to the motive power of the cavalry, artillery and transport,
namely the horses (see p. 67). By Tempelhoff's reckoning, a
theoretical army of 100,000 men would be accompanied by no less
than 48,000 horses. In winter quarters these ravenous creatures were
sustained by diy fodder - hay, straw and grain. The great difficulty
came when the army went to war, since the dry fodder was so bulky
that it could be readily transported only by water. Campaigning did
not normally begin 'before the green grass grows' (PC 1809, 10725),
which permitted the army to avail itself of the fresh fodder on the
theatre of war; and, as a matter of routine, powerful foraging parties
were sent out during every lull in operations to gather in the hay from
the fields, and raid the barns of the peasants for whatever dry fodder
might be found.
Both Frederick and the Austrians were adept at exploiting the
other's need for the constant intake of fodder. By eating-out the
enemy border regions, you could secure yourself against invasion for
weeks or months to come, and by penning up the hostile forces in a
single area, until it was thoroughly foraged-out, you could make
them decamp without the necessity of taking their positions by force.
This contest for fresh fields and pastures new provides the motive for
decisions that are otherwise inexplicable, and makes sense of many of
the long intervals in the campaigns in which nothing in particular