313 FREDERICK AND WARmeadows at Prague, the failure of the assaults on the rearward
Russian position behind the Kuh-Grund at Kunersdorf, and the mas-
sacre of the ten leading battalions of grenadiers at Torgau, which
Gaudi attributed directly to the exhaustion of the teams which drew
the Prussian guns.
Except at Leuthen, which was ground that was very well known
to the Prussians, Frederick had been accustomed to plunging into the
attack in almost total ignorance of the terrain and of the enemy
positions. Now that the allies knew what Old Fritz was about, the
Prussians encountered a series of increasingly unpleasant surprises,
and a direct challenge to Frederician battlecraft, which had relied so
much on the success of the opening gambit.
Where Frederick was able to keep the initiative, as at Leuthen,
the geometrical plan of the Oblique Order was sustained to great
effect. It was a different story when the enemy were waiting in
prepared positions, as at Kunersdorf, or when they made prompt
about-turns like Fermor at Zorndorf or Daun at Torgau. The Prussian
assaulting wings were devoid of the physical and psychological
support that was required to overcome opposition that was as stiff as
this. Moreover, as Clausewitz noted, the natural instinct of the
commanders was to try to re-establish contact with the rest of the
army. Hence at Zorndorf the division of Kanitz veered to the right,
out of the axis of the attack, leaving the advance guard to run into the
Russians unassisted.
Once things began to go badly wrong, Frederick had no ready
means of re-shaping the battle. The cavalry was the only element of
the Prussian army which was capable of dealing successive blows on
different parts of the field, as at Rossbach or at Zorndorf itself. The
infantry of the 'refused' wing could be brought into action only with
great difficulty, for it stood in a fixed relation to the striking force,
and it lacked the mobility and independence which are the attributes
of a genuine reserve.
We now proceed to the third or final stage of our story, in which
Frederick went in search of fresh inspirations which might restore his
advantage over his enemies. It is a long episode, which embraces not
only the last campaigns of the Seven Years War, but the War of the
Bavarian Succession. This quest took Frederick up to the very limits
imposed by the constitution of his army and the technology of the
time.
It is possible, but by no means certain, that Frederick was
tempted to follow the example of the Austrians, who had devised a
new form of combat, 'those fearsome attacks, aiming at the total
destruction of the enemy, carried out by separate corps which have
no direct communication with each other' (Cogniazzo, 1788-91, III,