314 FREDERICK AND WAR
276). This was the scheme of Hochkirch, Maxen and Liegnitz, and
Cogniazzo writes about it in terms which suggest that it was a matter
of general discussion among military men before the French Revolu-
tion.
Clausewitz was unaware of the ancestry of this phenomenon,
and he attributes the idea to Frederick, citing the detachment of
Finck's corps at Kunersdorf, a plan of 8 July 1760 for an attack on Lacy
in three columns, and the widely separated offensives of Frederick
and Zieten at Torgau (Kessel, 1937, 1). If we accept this reasoning,
Torgau emerges as at once the last great stand-up battle of old Europe,
and a kind of eighteenth-century Chancellorsville, in which a bold
commander divided his already inferior forces. It must be said, how-
ever, that hard evidence to this effect is lacking, and that in the
absence of documentary support we must be cautious about imposing
systems of war on Frederick, who did so much on the spur of the
moment. In any case the inter-operation of separated forces was
subject to excruciating difficulties at this period, since the various
corps and divisions were temporary ad hoc creations, and the com-
munications depended upon slow and vulnerable mounted messen-
gers. The Austrians discovered as much when they tried to annihilate
Frederick at Liegnitz.
We must turn to Frederick himself for firmer confirmation of the
new trends in his thought. During his period of reflection at Leit-
meritz, in June and July 1757, he considered whether, instead of using
his best troops to spearhead the assaults, he should actually engage
the worst - 'for this purpose we can employ the free battalions or
other bad units. We can shoot them up ourselves, if they fall back or
do not attack with sufficient enthusiasm' ('Aphorismen', 1757,
Oeuvres, XXX, 237).
The free battalions in question were 'detestable scum' (exec-
rabies Geschmeiss), raised for the duration of hostilities by cosmopo-
litan adventurers, and Frederick never regarded them as much more
than low-grade infantry, destined to spare his respectable troops by
operating in difficult country and secondary theatres of war, or, in
the present context, by absorbing punishment in battle ('Reflexions
sur la Tactique', 1758, Oeuvres, XXVIII, 162; 'Castrametrie', 1770,
Oeuvres, XXIX, 41; 'Instruction fur die Frei-Regimenter oder Leichten
Infanterie-Regimenter', 5 December 1783, Oeuvres, XXX, 399-406; PC
7868, 10702; Jany, 1903, 13-15; Dette, 1914, 78-80).
In the event, nearly all of the free battalions were assigned to the
command of Prince Henry, and Frederick did not spare his precious
grenadiers the ordeal of inaugurating the attack at Torgau. Possibly
his most recent victory at Liegnitz had encouraged him to believe
that his troops were, after all, as solid as the men he had led to war in