319 FREDERICK AND WARfrom smooth-bore muskets in volleys rather than in individual fire, as
was shown by Prussian experiments early in the next century.
Moreover, directed fire helped to conserve ammunition, and there-
fore postponed the blunting of the flints and the fouling of the musket
barrels.
Again, the classic Frederician linear formations were a proper
expression of the technical and social conditions of his time. It would
be unhistorical to draw direct comparisons between the tactical
forms that were valid in the eighteenth century, and those which
were influenced by the development of cheap, rapid-firing rifles one
hundred years later. In secret, Frederick deplored the fact that he had
nothing in kind to match the Croatian skirmishers of the Austrians,
but we should not reproach him for failing to convert his whole
infantry into swarms of little men who would have gone scampering
over the hills in coats of green. Light infantry was of marginal
consequence in the warfare of the time, since only regular troops in
dense formation had the firepower and solidity to resist cavalry in
open battle, and conquer and hold ground against heavy opposition.
No less importantly, Prussia lacked an institutional base on
which Frederick might have built an effective force of skirmishers.
The small bodies of Prussian jaegers were recruited from the
gamekeepers of the feudal estates, and their rifles, although very
accurate, were much slower to load than the smooth-bore musket,
which placed these gentry in some embarrassment when they faced
anything more dangerous than a deer or a rabbit. The j aegers actually
had their rifles taken away from them after some of their people were
cut down by the Russians at Spandau on 9 October 1760.
Still less reliance could be placed on the ephemeral free bat-
talions, who were not even composed of decent and steady men like
the jaegers. Only at the end of his reign did Frederick lay the
foundations of a regular light infantry, when he ordered the constitu-
tion of three permanent Frei-Regimenter. He had already outlined
the tasks he had in mind for them. On campaign they were expected
to perform outpost duty and the like. In battle, they could usefully
cover the flanks of the army, by occupying any areas of woodland.
More significantly, they might be told off to lead the attack, in which
case 'they must rush blindly straight into the enemy. It will be
absolutely forbidden for them to open fire before they engage in
hand-to-hand fighting' ('Instruction fur die Frei-Regimenter oder
Leichten Infanterie-Regimenter', 5 December 1783, Oeuvres, XXX,
401).
This sacrificial role was far removed from that assigned to the
Revolutionary or Napoleonic tirailleurs, who were to harass the
enemy from a distance by skirmishing fire. To that extent, Frederick