329 FREDERICK AND WARvironment which was less susceptible to direction. The fog of war
descended densely over the theatre of operations, and on many
occasions it deprived Frederick of all knowledge of events outside his
immediate locality, as in Moravia in 1758 after the Domstadtl
ambush, during the campaign of Bunzelwitz in 1761, and in the
course of the invasion of Bohemia in 1778. The communication across
the lower reaches of the Bohemian Elbe appears to have occasioned
particular difficulties. It bedevilled the liaison between Frederick
and Schwerin before the battle of Prague, and it isolated August
Wilhelm from the royal army during the retreat from Bohemia after
Kolin (PC 2937). Messages could pass with greater ease across the
northern plains. The lofty spire of the Catholic church in Schweidnitz
served as the watch tower of Lower Silesia, and in August 1761 and
again in June 1778 Frederick arranged for the fortress commandant to
signal Austrian movements to him through a simple code of rockets.
Strangely enough he was never prompted to carry this notion one
small step further, and establish a system of visual telegraphs.
In Napoleonic vein, Frederick once described the Duke of Bevern
as an unlucky commander (Anon., 1788-9, III, 23), but he knew that
misfortune could attend any general who ventured his reputation in
the lottery of war. Mischance had attended his expedition in Bohe-
mia in 1744, just as it dogged Prince Charles in the campaign of
Hohenfriedeberg, and yet 'the kind of person who could not lead a
patrol of nine men is happy to arrange armies in his imagination,
criticise the conduct of a general, and say to his misguided self: "My
God, I know I could do better if I was in his place!" ' (to Podewils, 14
July .1745, PC 1917).
We have already noticed how difficult it was for a commander to
exercise control over a combat, once it was joined. The plan was
usually concerted verbally with the generals on the eve of the battle;
on the actual day Frederick might control the alignment and pace of
the advancing troops, as at Leuthen, but thereafter he could seek to
influence events beyond range of his voice only by scribbling orders
on scraps of paper (using the back of the nearest staff officer as a rest),
and dispatching von Oppen or some other aide-de-camp to carry the
note to its destination.
Out of all of Frederick's actions, the affair at Burkersdorf was the
most tightly controlled. Each corps or brigade commander had his
precise task, and he was sent on his way by the king in person.
Leuthen was the nearest counterpart among the big battles.
Some of the other battles were a chronicle of accidents and heroic
expedients, such as those which turned out well at Hohenfriedeberg,
Rossbach and Liegnitz, or less happily, as at Hochkirch. On occasion
Frederick was separated from large elements of his army, whether