332 FREDERICK AND WARbecause he proceeded from the supposition that, in any
confrontation, the civilian was careful to avoid offending the
soldier, and the blame nearly always rested on the military
man. We find a characteristic sentiment in his first address to
the officers: 'Gentlemen, you have no idea how horrible I can
be!' (Hildebrandt, 1829-35, III, 58)Saldern held to the same principles at Magdeburg (Kiister, 1793,
91-3).
It was, perhaps, in the professional conditioning of his officers,
rather than the maintenance of their social exclusivity, that
Frederick is more to blame in historical perspective. This comment
will appear still stranger when we consider that Frederick sincerely
believed that he was making excellent provision for the future leader-
ship of the army:I put my officers through their paces unremittingly, while
explaining the reasons for my actions. I never tire of preaching,
and whenever I detect young officers who seem to have some
talent I call them to me, and instruct them with all possible
care. Do you know of another prince who goes in for teaching
like me? (Catt, 1884; see also 'Principes G£n6raux\ 1748,
Oeuvres, XXVIII, 41)
Thus Frederick compiled his Aliments de CastramHrie (1770) in
order to expand the vision of his generals beyond their immediate arm
of service, and instil the confidence that was requisite for indepen-
dent command.
Frederick extended considerable freedom to the detached gener-
als in the Seven Years War, and he insisted that they must take
decisions on their own head, without having recourse to councils of
war (PC 7796, 7805, 8609, 9189, 9414, 9839). When the generals in
question were theatre commanders, like Lehwaldt, Dohna, Hiilsen,
Ferdinand of Brunswick or Prince Henry, who were likely to lose
contact with royal headquarters for considerable lengths of time,
Frederick was careful to furnish them with wide-ranging political
and strategic overviews, so as to inform their judgment (PC 9791,
9798, 9887). These admirable principles were complemented by
Frederick's refusal to allow himself to be bound by questions of
seniority, when it was a question of pushing a good man forward (PC
10882).
Why did these attentions ultimately bear so little fruit? For a clue
to the answer, we must return to Prince Henry's prophetic memoran-
dum to the king of 1753. There he pointed out that the nobles were
paying so heavily for their privileges that they might be considered