333 FREDERICK AND WARthe victims rather than the beneficiaries of the system:
In every other country in the world the nobility represent the
first class of the body of the state, and they are given freedom of
choice as to what profession they wish to take up. But here the
father is compelled to deliver up his as-yet uneducated son at
the age of fifteen to the mercy of men of low extraction. These
folk seek to humiliate the young man by bringing him down to
their own level, and the result is that he finally adopts their
own base habits. (Herrmann, 1922, 259)This tyrannical treatment was prolonged by Frederick in his
everyday relations with his officers. The memoirs and records are
replete with examples of his contemptuous refusals of requests to go
on leave or retire, his obscenely phrased denials of permissions to
marry, his shattering rebukes to erring officers (which usually had
some foundation of justice), and his astonishing ingratitude to men
who had deserved well of him (which certainly did not).
Officers who over the years had schooled themselves to endure
such a life were incapable of transmuting themselves into prodigies of
independent enterprise when they were on campaign. Few comman-
ders were confident enough to take Frederick at his word when he said
that he had given them their heads, and in any case they suspected
that, when they had to render account, only offensive action or a very
obstinate defence were likely to commend them to their master.
There was a despairing resignation in the way that Lehwaldt and
Wedel threw themselves at the Russians at Gross-Jagersdorf and
Paltzig, or that Fouqu£ took up station in the path of superior forces at
Landeshut. Only two commanders usually had the nerve to tell
Frederick when it was better to hang back. One was Prince Henry,
who was reinforced by his birth and his military reputation, and the
other was Seydlitz, who maintained a kind of moral superiority over
the king until the end. It was all too easy for the run-of-the-mill
officer to find safety and occupation in the fulfilment of narrowly
conceived duties (Guibert, 1778, 126; Moore, 1779, II, 150-3;
Riesebeck, 1784, II, 139; Warnery, 1788, 250; Retzow, 1802, II, 164;
Lossow, 1826, 98; Preuss, 1832^1, I, 52; Yorke, 1913, III, 217; Tharau,
1968, 126). Guibert saw the Silesian regiments at the manoeuvres at
Neisse in 1773, and he observed:
Most of the officers, whether infantry or cavalry, turn out to be
no more clever than ours, when they find themselves out of
their regular order of battle, and forced to rely on their
intelligence to cope with problems which arrive at unexpected
times or places. In matters of detail I saw them commit the most