Frederick the Great. A Military Life

(Sean Pound) #1
23 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5

His officers were considered as mere adventurers in the trade of
arms; his soldiers, as vile mercenaries; and the name of
'Prussian' seldom occurred without some contumelious jest, or
some disgraceful epithet. The country itself, notwithstanding
its royal appelation, formed an undescribed species of
hermaphrodite monarchy, which partook rather of the
meanness of an electorate, than of the dignity of a kingdom.
(Gillies, 1789, 66-7)

In 1740 the population of Prussia before the Silesian conquest
reached scarcely two and a quarter million. By normal calculations
the reduction of Silesia might have seemed an impossible under-
taking, but Frederick understood that the unique war-readiness of his
army gave him a facility rather like that of a serpent, which may
unhinge its jaws to swallow a disproportionately large prey. He had
at his immediate disposal a contingency reserve of 10,000,000 thaler,
which proved in the event more than enough to defray the costs of the
entire war. The army already stood at the respectable total of 83,000
troops, and Frederick was carrying out an 'augmentation' of 10,000
further men and an increase in the cadres of his field infantry from
sixty-six battalions to eighty-three. The arsenals were gleaming with
weapons enough to equip this force twice over. To Frederick's way of
thinking, the opportunity of making this conquest became its own
justification (PC 125).


As Frederick had foreseen, he faced the problem of shouldering
aside neighbours who were as rapacious as himself, rather than
having to confront any power which might come rushing to the help
of Austria. The Saxons, Spanish and Piedmontese all entered claims
at the expense of the Austrian body politic, and the Wittelsbachs of
Ba4aria went on to make a successful bid for the vacant Imperial title
itself. The French and British were already locked in war. The
Russians, though long connected with the Austrians, were put out of
the reckoning by the death of Empress Anna on 9 November. Lastly,
Frederick made what appeared to be an astute evaluation of his
victim. The crisis found the House of Austria leaderless, its finances
exhausted, its army ruined, and many of its provinces ravaged by
plague, war and famine.
Frederick's announcements to the Austrian envoy and the
foreign courts were of the most cynical kind, and they need not detain
us for very long. Acting, he claimed, with the purest motives, he was
doing the Austrians a favour by leading his army into their territories,
and he required the cession of the whole of Silesia as an appropriate
reward for his services.
Military preparations began on 29 October, the day after the first
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