31 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5
undoubtedly premature, and it made its contribution to the one and a
half hours of confusion which nearly cost the Prussians their advan-
tage of surprise.
Such a head-on approach to an enemy force was a move which
Frederick sought to avoid in his later battles, for it brought a check in
the advance so as to allow the columns (which were not considered a
tactical formation) to make a right-angled turn and rearrange them-
selves into the two lines of battle, about 250 paces apart. Only when
the lines were formed could the onward march be resumed. More-
over, at Mollwitz the level, snow-covered ground and the low and
harsh sunlight seem to have conspired to throw out the Prussians'
sense of distance. If they thought they were much nearer Mollwitz
village than they really were, then they underestimated the space
they needed to win for their lines, and they tried to crowd all of their
forces onto a frontage of about 2,600 paces when 800 more would not
have been excessive. A number of units therefore found themselves
without a home - namely a grenadier battalion of the second column,
two regiments and one battalion of the infantiy of the fourth column,
and the whole of the battalions of the fifth column - and they all had
to be fitted in haphazardly along or between the lines of battle. The
effective width of front was constricted still further by the
Conradswaldauer-Bach and a companion stream on the south of the
field, which served to isolate the left wing of the cavaliy from the rest
of the army.
After the deployment was complete, Frederick gave the order to
advance at 1:30 p.m. Now at last the Prussian proficiency in drill
showed to full advantage. 'A captured Austrian lieutenant-colonel
had to admit... that it did not appear to be infantry that was
marching towards them, but moving walls' (Captain von Thile, in
Getfder, 1902, 115).
The right, or northern, wing was slanting forward towards the
enemy, and the Prussian heavy artillery went in front by bounds,
unlimbering, firing, then advancing to the next battery position. The
Prussian guns were concentrating their fire on a mass of Austrian
cavalry that was seen to be forming up to the north-east of Mollwitz.
Some of the Prussians saw that the ground turned black when the
cannon shot ripped the snow aside. Another witness noted that a
strong wind whipped the surface of the snow into a dense, billowing
cloud, which enveloped the enemy horse (Geuder, 1902, 94). Out of
this haze burst the entire left wing of the Austrian cavalry.
On this side of the field the hostile cavalry comprised 4,500
troopers under the command of General Rdmer, who was now intent
on winning time for the rest of the Austrian army to form up. The
2,000 horsemen of the Prussian right received the Austrian charge at