44 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5
of twelve battalions of infantry and fifteen squadrons of dragoons.
Here the undoubted hero was Joachim Seegebart, a field preacher of
the infantry regiment of Prinz Leopold (27). He first of all rallied his
comrades to throw back the Austrian grenadiers and cavalrymen who
had penetrated between their ranks: 'While I was thus engaged the
bullets flew around my head as thickly as a swarm of stinging gnats.
None of them hit me, thanks be to God, and even my coat was
untouched. In the melee a soldier tried to kill my horse with his
bayonet, but one of our men turned it aside' (Berenhorst, 1845-7, I,
99-100). Seegebart then restored a semblance of order to a body of
Prussian cavalry, in all likelihood some of the dragoons of the second
line. The Austrian assaults were supported by a powerful concentra-
tion of artillery, however, and by about 9 a.m. the Prussians were
forced to abandon Chotusitz after the enemy troops set fire to the
houses about their ears. Leopold re-formed on the north side of the
village, but Frederick later criticised him for having attempted to
hold the wretched place at all.
The greatest mystery of this confused morning concerns the
prolonged inactivity of Frederick and the powerful right wing of the
Prussian infantry, who were hiding all the time in the hollow. When
Frederick at last got on the move, the effect was decisive. It was at
about 10.30 a.m. that the Prussian lines began to press forward. They
marched some six hundred paces onto the plateau, then executed a
giant wheel to left, and opened a long-range fire of musketry against
the left flank of the Austrian forces around Chotusitz. The Austrians
immediately sensed the danger to the path of their retreat to Tschas-
lau, and within minutes their regiments dissolved over the fields.
The battle was over by 11 a.m. The chief Prussian staff officer,
Carl C. von Schmettau, urged Frederick to launch an immediate
pursuit and received the interesting reply: 'You are quite right, but I
don't want to defeat them too badly' (Schmettau, 1806, II, 222). In
any case, as Frederick mentioned in a conversation much later, his
own cavalry was in disorder, and he could not have advanced his
infantry too far without reducing them to the same condition (Gisors,
1868, 106).
The battle had been costly to both sides, depriving Frederick of
4,800 of his troops, and Prince Charles of 6,330. A large proportion of
the Austrian losses were made up of prisoners, and the Prussians had
actually suffered more than 1,000 more battle casualties than the
enemy, which reinforced the general impression that the victory was
more one of discipline and morale than of tactics.
Frederick blamed Leopold for the unreadiness of the army when
the Austrians struck early on the morning of the 17th. With greater
justice he promoted Buddenbrock to full general of cavalry, advanced