50 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5than a simplification of Frederick William's rules of 1726. With
partial revisions in 1750 and 1757, the regulations of 1743 determined
the routine of the infantry for the rest of the reign. For tactical
guidance, Frederick directed the officers to the ad hoc emendations
which he introduced, as the inspiration took him, over the following
years.
The lessons of the recent campaigns were perhaps more directly
reflected in the instructions which Frederick composed specifically
for the cavalry. The cavalry commanders were encouraged to attack
without waiting for orders, if they believed that they could do so with
advantage, and indeed they were threatened with cashiering if they
allowed the enemy to attack them first.
The early morning of Chotusitz had found the Prussians divided
and unprepared, and under the necessity of fighting on ground of
which they knew little. Frederick now told the hussars to venture out
in large detachments of two and four thousand at a time, and act 'like
a spider in a web, which is alive to every disturbance' (Hussar
Reglement, 1 December 1743). The commanders' responsibilities did
not end when they had seen the army properly settled into a new
position: 'Afterwards the generals... must reconnoitre the terrain
around the camp, and take due note of every small feature of the
ground' (Ordres fur die sammtlichen Generale, 23 July 1744, Oeuvres,
XXX, 121).
The lessons were brought home to the army during the spring
reviews and autumn manoeuvres of 1743. In addition, officers were
summoned from the provinces in order to attend the larger and more
instructive of these assemblies, or to learn from the example of crack
regiments like the Gens d'armes, the Zieten Hussars, or the super-
large regiment of the Bayreuth Dragoons.
The manoeuvres of September 1743 were of especial importance
in the learning process, for on two occasions Frederick staged minia-
ture operations with combined forces of infantry and cavalry. Here
was the foundation of the great autumn manoeuvres of the mass
conscript armies of Continental powers in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
No manoeuvres were staged in 1744, because the Prussians were
again at war. In one perspective Frederick was acting in the spirit of
the passage in the Antimachiavel in which he had written that a
prince was justified in opening hostilities in order to forestall a
threatened attack. The war between Maria Theresa and her enemies
was certainly turning to the Habsburg's advantage, as we have seen,
and she now enjoyed the support of a 'Pragmatic Army' of British,
Dutch and German auxiliaries. As a needful measure of security
Frederick concluded an alliance with the French on 5 June 1744.