54 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5
The long flank to the south-east came first within Frederick's
view, and he could see that the enemy were lining the crest of an
extensive ridge, from where the ground fell in an open and even slope
to a damp hollow, presenting a natural killing-ground. Frederick
knew from his principles of fortification that the salient of a defensive
position normally offered the most vulnerable point to an attack, but
at Point 525 at Marschowitz the Saxons had made an abatis (obstacle
of felled trees), and the approaches were impeded by two outlying
hills that were obviously inaccessible to the Prussian troops and guns.
The Prussian army trailed over to its right past the salient, and
from the direction of Neweklau Frederick caught his first view of the
allied left, extending away to the south-west. Here the access was
obstructed by three large lakes. Frederick now had a comprehensive
picture of the Marschowitz camp, and he was not tempted to make
the assault. Food and fodder were already running short, and later on
the 25th the Prussians began to fall back in the direction of Prague.
At the end of the nineteenth century the historians of the
German General Staff roundly declared: 'The Frederick who struck at
Prague, Leuthen and Torgau would not have shrunk from the assault'
(Gr. Gstb., 1895, III, 254). To this it is legitimate to rejoin that if he
had launched such an attack, he could well have encountered the
same reception as at Kolin or Kunersdorf. Frederick's caution was
amply justified when we consider the natural and artificial strength
of the position, the numbers of the enemy, and the state of his own
troops, who were cold, tired and hungry. The Marschowitz con-
frontation of 25 October was in fact an episode of some importance in
the histoiy of Frederick the commander, for it presented him for the
first time with a tactical dilemma of the kind that was to dominate
his conduct of operations in the final campaigns of the Seven Years
War.
More immediately, in Bohemia in the late autumn of 1744,
Frederick had by now everywhere surrendered the initiative to the
enemy. His conduct of strategic affairs was decidedly 'sticky', com-
pared with the uncompromising nature of his resolutions in the Seven
Years War, and it had occurred to him too late that he ought to do
something about evacuating the garrisons which he had left in
southern Bohemia. By nightfall on 23 October the strongpoints of
Budweis, Frauenberg and Tabor had all fallen to the Austrians, with a
loss of nearly 3,000 men.
Frederick was extravagant in his criticism of his own misjudg-
ments, when he wrote up his history of the campaign. He was,
however, probably correct when he concluded that what finished the
Prussians in Bohemia was the Fabian strategy of Prince Charles and
Field-Marshal Traun, and the utter hostility of the environment. It