Frederick the Great. A Military Life

(Sean Pound) #1
69 THE SILESIAN WARS, 1740-5

battalions of musketeers, fifteen companies of grenadiers, thirty
squadrons of cuirassiers and dragoons, fifteen companies of elite
carabiniers and mounted grenadiers, and sixteen heavy guns pointing
east towards the Prussian camp. Only a dense mist, and some
rearrangements along the six thousand paces of the line of battle,
prevented the allies from attacking at daybreak on 30 September.
Meanwhile the Prussians were enveloped in the mental fog
generated by their indifference to their surroundings, and by
Frederick's failure to grasp the Austrians' determination. His
thoughts at this time extended no further than arranging a leisurely
start to the march to Trautenau for ten in the morning. The many
detachments had reduced his army to 22,000 men, which was scarcely
half the number of the enemy, and in the General-Principia of 1753
he would warn his senior officers against making the same kind of
mistake.
At 5 a.m. on 30 September 1745 Frederick was talking with his
generals in his tent when the first report reached him that enemy
forces had been seen to his right. The single drummer of the headquar-
ters guard beat out the Generalmarsch in a thin rattle, and Frederick
and Hereditary Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau galloped to the
outposts to confirm the danger for themselves. Meanwhile the Mar-
quis de Valori admired the facility with which the Prussian battalions
and squadrons were ranging themselves in order without any kind of
higher direction.
The hastily formed Prussian units marched out of the camp by
their right. Since the position formed a rough east-west perpendicular
to the enemy, Frederick made the columns execute right turns
south-east of the village of Burkersdorf, then pushed them north until
the heads arrived at the foot of the Graner-Koppe, permitting him to
forii a line of battle parallel to the allies. Frederick's intention was to
hold back the centre and left as a reserve, and concentrate on his right
or northern flank in the region of the Graner-Koppe (Stille, 1764,
181). He hoped thereby to eliminate the very great danger to his
communications, which ran through Trautenau to Silesia. This pre-
liminary manoeuvre was almost accomplished when the mist dis-
solved at about 8 a.m., giving way to a warm and sunny autumn day.
The battle of Soor opened with an Austrian cannonade against
the horse of the Prussian right, moving beneath the Graner-Koppe:


Our cavalry withstood this ordeal with a composure that was
all the more admirable when you consider that the enemy
bombs frequently landed in the middle of the squadrons,
carrying away eight or ten horses at once. After every explosion
the troopers collected themselves, filled the gaps, and continued
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