THE ARMED CAMP, 174S-56 77edges that made up the manuscript of Les Principes Giniraux
de la Guerre appliques d la Tactique et d la Discipline des Troupes
Prussiennes. He revealed the work first of all to Prince August
Wilhelm, the eldest of his younger brothers, and then after a long
interval he supervised a German translation and printing as Die
General-Principia vom Kriege, which was issued to the generals
in 1753.
The Principes Gtniraux represent Frederick's most complete and
coherent statement on the management of war. It is therefore of some
interest that he first turned his attention not to tactics or strategy, but
to the specific problems of maintaining the Prussian army in good
order. He stressed the unique nature of the Prussian forces - the only
army in modern times to adhere to a truly Roman discipline, but also
one which was peculiarly susceptible to breakdown, thanks to the
very high proportion of foreign mercenaries in its ranks. Hence 'the
constitution of our troops is such that those who command them
must be tireless in their attention' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 4). Frederick
listed no less than fourteen safeguards against desertion, in the first
article of the work, 'Des Troupes prussiennes de leurs D6fauts et de
leurs A vantages'. All of this was designed to avert a disintegration of
the kind which had overtaken the army in 1744.
Articles II to X were of a useful but routine character, concerning
the evolution of plans of campaign (omitted from the General-
Principia) and the subsistence and encamping of the army. Article
XI, unpromisingly entitled 'Quand et pour quoi il faut faire des
Detachements', contained an important statement on the principle
of the concentration of force: 'Small minds want to cling on to
everything, but sensible men keep their attention on the principal
obyect... The man who tries to hang onto everything ends up by
holding nothing' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 37; see also p. 59 above).
Article XII, 'Des Talents qu'il faut £ un G6n6ral', was one of the
sections which did not appear in the German edition, for it revealed
too much about Frederick's arts of man-management.
The next fourteen articles were devoted to the science of reading
the intentions of the enemy, and to the conduct of active military
operations. After ruminating on the infinite variety of marches, the
precautions to be taken against the Austrian light troops, and the
ways of crossing or defending rivers, Frederick turned to the heart of
the matter, namely the general battle. The army was not to shrink
from an encounter witha superior enemy, for 'these are the occasions
on which my oblique order of battle can be employed to great effect.
You refuse one wing to the enemy, but you reinforce the attacking
wing, with which you deliver the assault against a single wing of the
enemy forces, taking them in flank. An army of 100,000 men, out-